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Pluralism in Contract Law
LEON TRAKMAN†
INTRODUCTION
Theoretical debate over the formation of contracts is
legendary.1 Is the foundation of contracts tied to the
subjective wills of parties who make promises to each other,
or is it about reasonable inferences arising from promise
bearing conduct that courts impute to the parties? Are
promises giving rise to contracts grounded in morality? Is
the formation of contacts about regulating contractual

† B.Com., LL.B. (Cape Town) LL.M., S.J.D. (Harvard). Immediate Past Dean
and Professor of Law, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia, The
author is grateful to Bob Hillman at Cornell Law School, Stewart Macaulay at
Wisconsin Law School, Brian Bix at Minnesota Law School for their valuable
comments on an earlier draft, to Emily Burke for her assistance, the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for funding the initial
research and the University of New South Wales for a decanal leave to write it.
1. On this theoretical debate, see, for example, STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS
CONTRACT INTERPRETATION, chs. 23 (2009); F.H. BUCKLEY, JUST EXCHANGE: A
THEORY OF CONTRACT (2005) [hereinafter BUCKLEY, JUST EXCHANGE]; M. P.
ELLINGHAUS ET AL., MODELS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF
THEIR UTILITY (2005); JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN
CONTRACT DOCTRINE (1991); ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT
LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW
(1997); ILLUSION OF CONSENT: ENGAGING WITH CAROLE PATEMAN (Daniel I.
O’Neill et al. eds., 2008); STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY (2004); THE FALL
AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley, ed., 1999); MICHAEL J.
TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1993); Nathan B. Oman, A
Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 77 (2009); Leon E. Trakman,
Contracts: Legal, in 3(8) INT’L ENCYC. SOC. & BEHAV. SCIS. 102 (Neil J. Smelser
& Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001). On the international dimensions of this debate, see
Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 225
(2009); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155
(2007).
OF
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rights and duties, or is it about enforcing contracts that are
economically efficient?2
Most theories of contract formation respond to one or
another of these questions, not to all of them. Most of these
theories are also expressed through monism. Monism
subjects all ‘‘rights’’ and ‘‘goods’’ to a single determinative
measure, conceived as a ‘‘super’’ or prime value, such as the
liberty of the parties to contract.3 That value is articulated
through the wills, consent, or promises of the parties, or
more comprehensively through the utility or efficiency of
the contract.4
Preference monists prefer different ‘‘super’’ values, so
long as their preferred values transcend all ‘‘lesser’’ values.5
2. On the wills theory of contracting, see infra Section II. On consent
theories of contracting, see infra Section III. On moral theories of contracting,
see infra Section VI. On efficiency theories of contracting, see infra Section IX.
On the proposition that the moral basis of a contract is based on the consent of
the parties to exercise rights and assume duties, see Randy E. Barnett, A
Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986). On public policy
rationale behind legally binding promises, see R.A. BUCKLEY, ILLEGALITY AND
PUBLIC POLICY (2002); M.P. FURMSTON, CHESHIRE, FIFOOT AND FURMSTON’S LAW
OF CONTRACT 449 (14th ed. 2001); Leon E. Trakman, The Effect of Illegality in
the Law of Contract: Suggestions for Reform, 55 CAN. BAR REV. 625 (1977). See
generally CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, RULES OF
CONTRACT LAW (20092010 STATUTORY SUPPLEMENT), chs. 12 (2009); RICHARD
STONE, THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACT ch.1 (8th ed. 2009). For a useful index
and digest of writings on contract law, see ADAM KRAMER, CONTRACT LAW: AN
INDEX AND DIGEST OF PUBLISHED WRITINGS (2010).
3. Monism has a lengthy history. For example, the first issue of the
philosophical journal, “The Monist,” was published in 1890. For more
information, see The Monist: An International Journal of General Philosophical
Inquiry, http://themonist.org (last visited Sept. 25, 2010).
4. Most monist conceptions, to a lesser or greater extent, are rights based
theories of contracting in that they focus on the rights and duties of the
contracting parties, as distinct from community values or responsibilities
beyond those rights. See LEON E. TRAKMAN & SEAN GATIEN, RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES (1999). On a “rights based” theory of contracting based on
private property, see Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 NW. U.
L. REV. 1 (2009).
5. Preference monism entails a preference for values that are
commensurable and able to be integrated harmoniously. On preference monism
in utilitarian philosophy, see, for example, JOHN STUART MILL, Utilitarianism, in
THE BASIC WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART MILL 241 (J.B. Schneewind & Dale E.
Miller eds., 2002). On the hierarchical ordering of values in monism as distinct
from pluralism, see, for example, WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE
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They also subscribe to a hierarchy of values, such as to a
hierarchy of liberty, equality, or efficiency values in
contracting, subject to one ‘‘super’’ value such as the liberty
to contract standing at the apex of that hierarchy.6
What preference monist conceptions of contracting lack
is a sustainable basis for differentiating among ‘‘super’’
values that conflict and collide, such as between liberty to
contract and equality in contracting.7 If judges are
concerned primarily with the liberty of the parties to
contract, they cannot as readily focus on other values like
equality in contracting, other than through the
subordination of those values to liberty. If they are
engrossed with preserving one ‘‘super’’ value that
determines the binding force of contractual promises, they
cannot concentrate as readily on moral, political, cultural,
or legal values that otherwise might circumscribe that
‘‘super’’ value.8
Pluralist theories of contracting do not endorse a
‘‘super’’ value, but instead acknowledge a plurality of values
that are commensurable or incommensurable with one
IMPLICATIONS
(2002).

OF

VALUE PLURALISM

FOR

POLITICAL THEORY

AND

PRACTICE 6

6. On an allencompassing monist philosophy of justice, see, for example,
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). On monist wills, consent, and
promise theories of contracting, see infra Sections II, III, and VI respectively.
On monist utility and efficiency theories, see infra Section IX. But cf. RONALD
DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 45 (2000).
7. For a classical treatment of this conflict between liberty and equality, see
ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969). For a critique of monism
generally, see GALSTON, supra note 5, at 8.
8. On this preoccupation with why a promise is legally enforceable, Mel
Eisenberg once proclaimed: “A promise, as such, is not legally enforceable. The
first great question of contract law, therefore, is what kinds of promises should
be enforced.” Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL
L. REV. 640, 640 (1982); see also Omri BenShahar & Lisa Bernstein, The
Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1885 (2000). Most theories of
judging are grounded either in legal positivism or in legal realism, not legal
pluralism. On a blend between legal formalism and legal realism, referred to as
“realistic formalism”, see Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (2007). But see David Dyzenhaus,
The Very Idea of a Judge, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 61 (2010); Neil Duxbury, Lord
Wright and Innovative Traditionalism, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 265 (2009). See also
infra Section XIV.
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another according to the contractual context.9 Decision
agents—typically courts—use that pluralism to identify and
rank the intensity of plural preferences and apply them
through a process of practical reason in order to reach
prudential decisions about the formation of contracts.10 For
example, judges rank values like liberty to contract and
equality in contracting on a ranking scale in which they pay
due cognizance to continuing and discontinuing moral,
political and cultural values.11 They analyze those values
through a process of practical reason through which they
assimilate competing and supporting propositions in
arriving at preferred determinations about the formation of
a contract.12
As illustrations of different kinds of pluralism at work,
judges employ political pluralism to synthesize competing
governmental policies over anticompetitive agreements,
9. On such commensurable and incommensurable values, see, for example,
MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VALUES (1990); BERNARD WILLIAMS,
MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 19731980 (1981); David Wiggins,
Incommensurability: Four Proposals, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY
AND PRACTICAL REASON 52 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997).
10. This combination of deliberative practical reason and prudential wisdom
is expressed here through the conception of “preference pluralism.” See infra
notes 12, 17. On measuring the intensity of plural preferences, see Daphna
LewinsohnZamir, Identifying Intense Preferences, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1391
(2009).
11. For the view that liberty and equality are fundamentally in conflict, see
BERLIN, supra note 7. On moral pluralism, see, for example, JOHN KEKES, THE
MORALITY OF PLURALISM (1993); CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL
COMPLEXITY (1987); Ruth Chang, Putting Together Morality and WellBeing, in
PRACTICAL CONFLICTS: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 118 (Peter Baumann &
Monika Betzler eds., 2004). On political pluralism particularly in relation to
“public” cultures, see MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983). On cultural pluralism including the treatment
of emerging and receding cultural values, see infra Section XIV.
12. Such preference pluralism is distinguished from foundational pluralism
in not accepting that one value prevails over all others, for example, that liberty
to contract prevails over equality or efficiency in contracting. It is arguable that
a normative pluralist may also be a foundational monist in expressing a
preference for both different kinds of values such as liberty and equality
(normative or preference pluralism) but also for a super value among those
values (foundational monism). For classical commentary on normative and
preference pluralism, see GEORGE EDWARD MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA (1903). On
foundational pluralism, see, for example, Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right and
the Good, 94 J. PHIL. 273, 27576 (1997).
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such as assessing the source and social impact of “judgment
sharing agreements.”13 They use cultural pluralism to
analyze emerging and receding cultural attitudes towards
duties of cooperation in the formation and performance of
contracts, such as in imposing duties to keep records, share
information about performance, permit audits, and not hide
breaches of contract.14 Judges invoke moral pluralism in
establishing the boundaries between the duties of mass
market suppliers to contract in “good faith” with repeat
order customers and their resort to boilerplate contracting
with oneoff end users.15 In reaching prudential
determinations, judges invoke “decision procedures” to
identify the “adjudicative facts” and to differentiate them
from “social fact.”16 They employ “practical reason” to reach
prudential determinations in which they determine the
rights and responsibilities of the contracting parties within
disparate political, cultural, and economic contexts.17
13. “Judgment sharing agreements” are instruments firms use to agree to
contribute to antitrust penalties if one party is subsequently held liable,—in
effect constituting a coinsurance contributory scheme. See Christopher R.
Leslie, JudgmentSharing Agreements, 58 DUKE L.J. 747, 749 (2009). On the
extent to which such agreements undermine antitrust regulatory policy, see id.
at 76884. On a response to the illegality of “lockout agreements” by which a
party agrees not to deal with a third party, see Barak D. Richman, The Antitrust
of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted Refusals to
Deal, 95 VA. L. REV. 325 (2009).
14. See, e.g., Gregory Klass, Contracting for Cooperation in Recovery, 117
YALE L.J. 2, 2 (2007). On arguments for using liquidated damages clauses to
discourage uncooperative behavior, see Tess WilkinsonRyan, Do Liquidated
Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Inquiry, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633,
66465 (2010). For an argument in favor of resort to negative damages, see
Barry E. Adler, Efficient Breach Theory Through the Looking Glass, 83 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1679, 169495 (2008).
15. On the complexity of moral pluralism, not limited to judicial analysis, see,
for example, T.D.J. CHAPPELL, UNDERSTANDING HUMAN GOODS: A THEORY OF
ETHICS 113 (1998); LARMORE, supra note 11, at 9697; MORAL DILEMMAS
(Christopher W. Gowans ed., 1987); MORAL UNIVERSALISM AND PLURALISM
(Henry S. Richardson & Melissa S. Williams eds., 2009); Lawrence C. Becker,
Places for Pluralism, 102 ETHICS 707, 70719 (1992); Chang, supra note 11.
16. On “decision procedure” pluralism, see infra text accompanying note 38.
On “social fact” evidence, see infra note 206. On the application of decision
procedures to cultural pluralism, see infra Section XIV.
17. On “practical reason” in making normative choices among
incommensurable values, see Joseph Raz, Incommensurability Agency, in
INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 9, at
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The article has the following aims in arguing for judicial
pluralism in the formation of contracts. Firstly, it evaluates
how courts can apply value pluralism to different theories of
contract formation that complement and sometimes
contradict one another, such as by applying autonomy and
communitybased theories to contract formation. Secondly,
it illustrates how judges can reconcile competing theories of
contract formation by moving along a spectrum from the
subjective to the objective theory of contracting.18 Thirdly, it
analyzes how courts can horizontally integrate rightsbased
theories of contracting pertaining to comparatively equal
bargaining parties. Fourthly, it considers how judges can
vertically integrate equalitybased theories of contract
formation based on structural inequalities in bargaining
between the parties. Finally, it proposes how courts can
invoke “decision procedures” to assess the nature, manner
of operation, and sufficiency of horizontally and vertically
integrated contract theories.19
In exploring these issues, the article canvasses the
extent to which judges already apply plural approaches to
contract formation. However, it argues for decision agents
not limited to courts applying plural values more explicitly
and contextually to contracting. The overriding rationale is
that a theory of legal pluralism can significantly inform the

110; see also JOSEPH RAZ, ENGAGING REASON: ON THE THEORY OF VALUE AND
ACTION 48 (1999) (“If of the options available to agents in typical situations of
choice and decision, several are incommensurate, then reason can neither
determine nor completely explain their choices or actions.”). It is arguable that
Raz’s imputation of “practical reason” to rational choice is reductionist. A more
accurate descriptor of the normative choice among incommensurable values is
practical reason grounded in preference pluralism. Exercising preferences
among plural alternatives are practical reasons for those choices. For a plural
account of “duty” and “power” expressed through a “compound rule” in contract
law, see Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound
Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726, 175860 (2008). On a plural theory of rights and
responsibilities, see TRAKMAN & GATIEN, supra note 4, at chs. 12.
18. See infra Section II.
19. On a different conception of vertical and horizontal integration, see
Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483,
1498506 (2005) (reviewing STEPHEN A SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY (2004)). On
structural disparities in bargaining, see infra note 37.
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formation of contracts, without regressing into unbridled
relativism, or auguring the “death” of contracts.20
Each section addresses one or more of these
propositions. Connecting the various sections is the
recognition of an ongoing tension between rightsbased and
goodsbased theories of contract formation and the need for
neither to be subjugated by the other.
The article treats judges as actual or simulated decision
agents in regulating contracts, subject to two exceptions.
Legislatures are the primary decision agents under theories
of contract regulation. Contracting parties are decision
agents under theories of contract selfregulation, and to a
degree, in relational contracting.
I. FROM MONISM TO PLURALISM
Monist wills theories of contract formation trace back
to, among other sources, natural law conceptions of “right
reason”21 embodied in modern deontological liberalism.22
That liberty consists of the right of autonomous individuals
to engage in intentional or “expressive” actions as free and
voluntary agents, insulated from the invasive intervention
of third parties including public authorities. Courts as
decision agents, in turn, are expected to respect the
“expressive liberty” of autonomous contracting parties.23
20. This plural conception is distinguishable from the late Grant Gilmore’s
conception of the “death” of contract arising, inter alia, from the alleged erosion
of consent in contracting and the growth of tortbased “fault” as a substitute
value determinant. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87103 (1974).
Contestation around plural values in contracting is a challenge for contract law
which is quite different from its conceptual or normative death. See infra
Sections VIIX.
21. On the (natural law) liberal roots of deontological liberalism in the
formation of contracts, see generally P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM
OF CONTRACT (1979); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999); CHRISTOPHER
WOLFE, NATURAL LAW LIBERALISM (2006).
22. Deontological liberalism relies on rights that inhere in individuals, rather
than in “goods” that are shared. Such a conception is monist in subscribing to
unitary values that are identified with the liberal or “autonomy” rights of
individuals, such as their rights to contract. See TRAKMAN & GATIEN, supra note
4, at ch. 2.
23. On “expressive liberty” as a balance between outward existence and inner
conceptions of value, see WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS,
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A court that endorses legal monism enshrines a “super”
or prime value, such as the liberty to contract by placing it
at the apex in ranking contract values. For example, it
treats the subjective wills of the parties in contracting as its
prime value;24 or it adopts other “super” value, such as
efficient contracting as the prime value.25 It then applies
that chosen “super” value in determining whether to enforce
a contract according to its assessment of the subjective wills
of the parties or the efficiency of their transaction.26
A monist court sometimes takes account of such social
values as welfare, harmony, solidarity, and community; but
it subordinates those values to a “super” value based on the
wills, consent, or promises of the parties, as explicated
through their liberty to contract.27 For example, a monist
court is likely to nullify an unconscionable contract, not
primarily because it is unfair in a moral or cultural sense,
but because it is an affront to the “super” value which that
court identifies with the subjective wills or manifest consent
of the parties. That transaction is unconscionable, on
principled monist grounds, because it conflicts with the
primacy of the will to, or consent in, contracting.28
VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 14062 (1991). On the normative
relationship between love and liberalism in JudeoChristian value systems, see
PAUL W. KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE 22027 (2005); see also infra
Section VII.
24. “According to the classical view, the law of contract gives expression to
and protects the will of the parties, for the will is something inherently worthy
of respect.” Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 575
(1933). On the genesis of this classical view, see SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK,
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT (4th ed., Blackstone Publ’g Co. 1888) (1876); see also
infra Sections II.
25. See infra Section IX.
26. Parties who freely conclude contracts are legally “bound by their pacts”:
pacta sunt servanda. On the ancient origins of this concept, see Paradine v. Jane
(1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B.).
27. On the predominance of the parties’ liberty to contract, see, for example,
BUCKLEY, supra note 1, at 2733; see also EXPLORING CONTRACT LAW (Jason W.
Neyers et al. eds., 2009).
28. On the primacy of consent in contracting, see infra Section III. For
classical commentary on “contracts of adhesion,” see Friedrich Kessler,
Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM.
L. REV. 629 (1943) [hereinafter Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion]; Friedrich
Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law, Part 1: A
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Pluralist decision agents question the primacy of monist
values such as the will, promises, or consent of the parties,
as well as its dominance over a hierarchy of subordinated
values. They decide, as courts, whether or not to enforce the
wills, manifest consent or promises, of the parties, not on
grounds that one value is inevitably prior to all others, but
by identifying, ranking, and applying a plurality of
competing values that may, but need not, be commensurate
with one another.29
As a result, judges who subscribe to pluralism decline to
treat any one value as inherently or naturally superior to all
others in the formation of contracts.30 They construe values
like the wills of the parties or the efficiency of their
contracts, not as a priori more fundamental than all other
values, but according to how those values relate to one
another and to other competing values.31 As an illustration,
pluralist courts attribute different qualities to “rightness”
and “fairness” values in regulating the formation of e
consumer transactions.32 For example, they weigh the
“autonomy” value of esellers competing over price in e
markets against the “care” value in regulating the sale of
unsafe products to econsumers.33 They assess the social cost
Comparative Study, 74 YALE L.J. 262, 28182 (1964); Edwin W. Patterson, The
Delivery of a LifeInsurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919).
29. On such a pluralist approach, see infra Sections XII and XIV. On “the
good,” see, for example, FRED FELDMAN, PLEASURE AND THE GOOD LIFE Ch. 1
(2004); CHRISTINE SWANTON, VIRTUE ETHICS: A PLURALISTIC VIEW 5660 (2003);
see also BERLIN, supra note 7.
30. On these values, see, for example, TRAKMAN & GATIEN, supra note 4, at
Chs. 12; Thomson, supra note 12, at 27576.
31. See supra note 30.
32. Preference pluralists—like preference monists—treat “fairness” or
“goodness” as a value with different qualities. However, unlike preferential
monists, preferential pluralists do not treat one conception of “goodness” as
inherently superior to all others. On preference monists, see supra text
accompanying note 4. On a preference pluralist perspective in law, see, for
example, RAZ, supra note 17, at ch. 3. On the ranking of “goodness values” in
relation to cultural pluralism, see infra Section XIV.
33. On the plural intersection between contracts and torts in products
liability cases, see infra note 94. On an allegedly plural conception of contract
asproduct, as distinct from a monist conception of contractasconsent, see, for
example, Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding
Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125, 112526 (2000).
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of edistributors using warranty exclusion clauses in “click
wrap” and “browsewrap” contracts against the discounted
prices that econsumers may gain in such emarkets.34 They
devise decision procedures by which they balance the
“surprise” value to econsumers who are prohibited by
contract from returning defective products against the
“clarifying” value of fine print clauses in econtracts that
explain such prohibitions.35
Plural decisionmakers, not limited to judges, may well
disagree over the prudential application of plural values in
seemingly comparable cases.36 For example, uniform law
commissioners diverge over how to regulate product
disclosure statements by mass esellers according to
different perceptions of the disempowerment those
statements have upon discrete classes of econsumers.37 The
issue is not that such differences in the processes and
results of plural decision making give rise to unbridled
relativism, but that value pluralism extends the base of
knowledge by which decision agents reach informed
decisions that include differences of opinion.38
34. On “clickwrap” and “browsewrap” contracts, see infra note 126. On
“consent” to standard form contracts, see Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form
Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 637 (2002).
35. On such decision procedures, see infra Section XI.
36. On the bases for theoretical disagreement in legal analysis, see Brian
Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215 (2010);
Scott J. Shapiro, The ‘‘HartDworkin’’ Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed,
in RONALD DWORKIN 22, 49 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007).
37. The case for courts injecting plural standards of fairness into contracts is
reinforced in transactions involving structural bargaining disparities between
parties. See, e.g., Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The
Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1270
(1993); Andrew Phang, Doctrine and Fairness in the Law of Contracts, 29 LEGAL
STUD. 534 (2009). Such judicial construction is most evident, historically, in the
law regulating insurance contracts. See, e.g., 2 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE
CLAIMS & DISPUTES: REPRESENTATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES AND INSUREDS §
9 (5th ed. 2007); Kenneth S. Abraham, JudgeMade Law and JudgeMade
Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV.
1151, 115256 (1981); Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823 (1990);
Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970).
38. Courts may also employ “covering values” as the framework in which they
weigh and sort plural values. See Chang, supra note 11, at 118.. On variations
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Plural decision making also does not necessarily lead to
results that are distinct from monist decision making in the
formation of contracts. Monist and pluralist decision agents
may actually lead to the same result. A monist judge
interpreting the Restatement (Second) may adopt the
parties’ unusual meaning, that all sales contracts exceeding
$1,000 be oral and not reduced to writing, in accordance
with the subjective wills of the parties. A pluralist court
may reach the same determination, but only after
considering such relational factors as the trust and
confidence placed by the contracting parties in each other
and such sociocultural factors as their respective
reputations and goodwill in the trade.39
What distinguishes pluralist from monist decision
making is the unwillingness of pluralist decision agents to
accord primacy to a single value before assessing its
commensurability with other values in resolving disputes
over the formation of contracts.40 What further
differentiates “decision procedure” pluralism from monism
is the readiness of pluralist judges to identify a range of
“rightness” and “goodness” values, to consider plural
reasons in ranking them, and to construe the formation of
contracts in light of those values and reasons.41
II. PLURALISM: BEYOND A WILLS THEORY
In applying monism to a wills theory of contracting, the
alternative is between judges upholding or nullifying an
in “decision procedure” pluralism, see, for example, R. Eugene Bales, Act
Utilitarianism: Account of RightMaking Characteristics or DecisionMaking
Procedure? 8 AM. PHIL. Q. 257 (1971); see also infra Section XI.
39. On trust building as an instrument in interpreting the intention of
parties to contract, see Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 VA. L. REV. 1437
(2009).
40. For arguments in favor of implying “fairness” values into contracts in
cases of commercial impracticability, see Leon E. Trakman, Winner Take Some:
Loss Sharing and Commercial Impracticability, 69 MINN. L. REV. 471 (1985).
For arguments in favor of imputing efficiency values to such contracts, see
Sheldon W. Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability:
Searching for “The Wisdom of Solomon”, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1123, 1133 (1987).
On impliedinfact and impliedbylaw values in the consent to contract, see
infra Section III.
41. See supra note 40.
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agreement in accordance with the subjective wills of the
parties.42 A judge who considers the dignity, knowledge,
desire, welfare, and happiness of the parties subordinates
those values to their subjective wills.43 For example, a
monist court evaluates the reasonable reliance and unfair
surprise as evidence of a “vice” or “defect” in the subjective
wills of the parties, not as part of a further plural inquiry
beyond those wills.44 It concludes that, due to the “defect” in
the subjective wills of the parties, there is no contract.45
A pluralist court goes further by considering plural
values beyond the subjective wills of the parties. It
conceivably starts by observing that the parties did not
manifest subjective wills; that their subjective wills were
incompletely expressed;46 or that they had different
subjective wills. In reaching a decision, it affirms or
discounts their subjective wills in light of the plural
alternatives.47
42. On the wills theory in contracts, see, for example, BUCKLEY, JUST
EXCHANGE, supra note 1, at 2728. On the evolution of the wills theory of
contracts in Continental European philosophical and legal thought, see
GORDLEY, supra note 1, ch. 7.
43. A plural assessment of values helps to extend both the parameters and
application of monist values. Cf. RAZ, supra note 17, at 48 (“The will is the
ability to choose and perform intentional actions.”).
44. Such a “vice” or “defect” negates the wills of the parties and therefore
does not conflict with a subjective wills theory. See Stephen A. Smith,
Contracting Under Pressure: A Theory of Duress, 56 CAMBRIDGE L J. 343 (1997);
see also infra Section V.
45. Contradictory subjective wills of the parties is illustrated in the classic
English case, Raffles v Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (1864) (This is primarily
a ‘‘mistake’’ case, in which the parties agreed upon shipment ex peerless, but
each had a different “Peerless” ship in mind, and they were at cross purposes
lacking consensus ad idem).
46. In Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, a case on commercial
impracticability arising from the 1966 Suez Canal closure, Judge Skelly Wright
stated: “Parties to a contract are not always able to provide for all the
possibilities of which they are aware, sometimes because they cannot agree,
often simply because they are too busy.”. 363 F.2d 312, 318–19 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
47. The civil law may be more responsive to plural theory than the common
law in being less preoccupied with rights based theories of contracting grounded
in the liberty to contract. See generally JAMES GORDLEY, THE ENFORCEABILITY OF
PROMISES IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (2001); see also LARRY A. DIMATTEO,
CONTRACT THEORY: THE EVOLUTION OF CONTRACTUAL INTENT 22 (1998). But see
THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS (Peter Benson ed., 2001).
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A court that adheres to an objective theory of
contracting is sometimes monist and other times pluralist.48
It is monist in according objective meaning to the unclearly
or incompletely expressed wills of the parties, while
continuing to defer to the wills or intention of the parties. It
is pluralist in valuing “rightness” and “goodness” values
beyond those wills, such as in light of the dignity,
knowledge, welfare, or safety of third parties who are
affected by those contracts. Monist and pluralist judges that
adhere to an objective theory of contracting could both
determine that the subjective wills of the parties are ill
expressed or are at cross purposes. However, a monist judge
would conclude on these bases that there is no binding
contract. A pluralist court would decide only after
identifying, ranking, and applying plural options of which
the subjective wills of the parties is but one.49
A court can adopt a spectrum approach to reconcile
monist and pluralist approaches toward the objective theory
of contracting. On one end of the spectrum, it locates the
subjective wills of the parties. On the other end, it reaches a
plural determination which transcends their wills.
Depending on the nature and extent of that continuum, its
determination affirms, elaborates upon, discounts, or
substitutes for the wills of the parties. For example, it
initially gauges the subjective wills of the parties. It then
augments their wills by determining the reasonable
intentions of the parties based on their past practices. It
concludes by imputing to them an implied covenant to
negotiate in good faith that transcends the past practices of
one or both parties.50

48. See, e.g., Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of
Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427 (2000).
49. The absence of the perfected wills of the parties is central to an objective
theory of contracting, whether or not it is grounded in monism or pluralism. See
BURTON, supra note 1, at chs. 23; see also Janet O’Sullivan, Book Review, 56
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 231 (1997) (reviewing CONSENSUS AD IDEM: ESSAYS ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACT IN HONOUR OF GUENTER TREITEL (F.D. Rose, ed., 1996)).
50. In progressing along this continuum, a wills theory of contracting can be
recast into an implied consent theory. See infra Section III. On Barnett’s
“default rules” in the formation of contracts, see Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of
Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992). On
an implied covenant of good faith, see infra note 206.
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The practical difficulty with adopting a spectrum
approach toward the subjective and objective theories of
contracting is in determining when a court employs an
objective theory only to augment the wills of the parties and
when it uses it to transcend those wills.51 A further difficulty
is to acknowledge that the purpose of value pluralism is not
to replicate the wills of the parties. Nor is it to transform an
objective theory of contracting into a ‘‘super’’ value that
trumps all other values. The purpose is to rank plural
values in relation to one another, not locate them on an
unbroken spectrum from subjective to objective theories of
contracting.52
III. RECONSTITUTING CONSENT
An alternative to the wills theory of contract formation
is for courts to enforce contracts to which the parties have
expressly or impliedly consented.53 Courts conceivably opt
for monist or plural conceptions of consent that may be, but
are not necessarily, mutually exclusive.54 They adopt monist
to the exclusion of pluralist conceptions of contracting in
subscribing to the express or implied consent of the parties
that trump countervailing community values.55 They resort
to pluralist conceptions of consent by implying mandatory
terms into contracts based on interrelated liberty and
community values. For example, they rank the liberty and
efficiency of liability limitation clauses in mass market sales

51. For classical commentary on the extent to which an objective theory of
contracting supplements or contradicts a subjective theory of contracting, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 2 cmt. b (1979); E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 3.6 (1982); Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and
Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589 (1974).
52. The plural nature of the objective theory of contracting is best illustrated
through moral pluralism. See infra Part VI.
53. Randy Barnett espouses a general consent theory of contract. See
Barnett, supra note 2, at 30910.
54. See id. at 305.
55. In subscribing to an objective measure of consent, Randy Barnett
emphasizes the difficulty in ascertaining the subjective state of mind of the
parties, but he does not see anything contradictory between his conception of
objective consent and consent as a subjective measure of agreement. See id. at
30509.
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in light of the ‘‘confusion,’’ ‘‘surprise,’’ and ‘‘hardship’’ they
cause to firsttime purchasers in those markets.56
The difference between a monist and a pluralist theory
of consent is illustrated by three default rules proposed by
Randy Barnett.57 Under the first default rule, courts
implement the parties’ ‘‘direct consent,’’ which includes
their ‘‘express’’ or ‘‘impliedinfact’’ consent.58 Under the
second default rule, courts enforce the parties’ ‘‘indirect
consent’’ or ‘‘impliedinlaw’’ consent.59 Under the third
default rule, courts apply ‘‘impliedinlaw immutable terms’’
that supersede the consent of the parties.60
The first two default rules, ‘‘direct’’ and ‘‘indirect’’
consent to contract, are ordinarily monist insofar as they
expect judges to implement the express consent of the
parties, or the consent which derives reasonably from that
direct consent. The third default rule, ‘‘impliedinlaw
immutable terms,’’ is ordinarily pluralist insofar as a judge
adopts an amalgam of efficiency, fairness, or other
‘‘goodness’’ values that transcend the consent of the
parties.61 For example, a court invokes immutable implied
inlaw values of ‘‘fair dealings’’ to trump terms to which the
parties directly agreed on grounds that those terms are
unduly harsh, oppressive, or unusual in the context.62
Pluralist judges also adopt immutable terms to determine
56. On clarifying “confusion” values, see, for example, id. at 318. On
reconciling confusion, surprise, and hardship values with free choice and
efficiency values in standardized consumer contracts that exclude or limit
liability, see infra notes 10004 and the accompanying text. On ‘‘irrelevant
confusion’’ in contracting, see Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant
Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2010).
57. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 31014. On monist theories of contracting
grounded in default rules, see Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and
Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 611–12 (1998). But see W.
DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 20THCENTURY REFORMATION OF
CONTRACT LAW 21 (1996).
58. See Barnett, supra note 50, at 827.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 82728.
61. Id. It is arguable that all three default rules in consent theory, including
immutable impliedinlaw consent, are monist in that they each subscribe to
unitary values. Even immutable impliedinlaw values may draw upon a single
unitary conception of public value that trumps all other values.
62. See Barnett, supra note 34, at 637.
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the contract price according to community standards of fair
dealings,63 in the absence of, or substitution for, the direct or
indirect consent of the parties.64
Treating immutable impliedinlaw terms pluralistically
is not without risk. One risk is in paying lip service to
immutable impliedinlaw terms only to discount those
terms in deference to a monist conception of consent.65 A
converse risk is in adopting immutable impliedinlaw terms
in order to effectuate a preselected and nuanced conception
of “fairness.”66 These risks are attributable not to preference
pluralism, but to its simulation.
Plural decision making has particular value by
extending the scope of direct and indirect consent without
being marginalized by it.
IV. OBLIGATION AS CHECKLIST OR PLURALITY?
A monist basis for upholding a contract is that the
parties are bound by a checklist of legal requirements that
relate to their wills, promises, or consent, notably: an offer
and acceptance; a serious intention to contract; valid
consideration; and the presence of complete, certain and
nonillusory terms.67 As an illustration, a court uses a
63. For example, a court may construe an unreasonable price term in a
contract restrictively on grounds that the values of commercial expediency and
fairness transcend the express or inferred consent of the parties. U.C.C. § 2–305
(2005) empowers courts to imply terms in contracts of sale, including by
establishing a reasonable market price that encompasses plural values beyond
the consent of the parties. See Koch Hydrocarbon Co. v. MDU Res. Group, 988
F.2d 1529, 1534 (8th Cir. 1993); Lickley v. Max Herbold, Inc., 984 P.2d 697
(Idaho 1999); see also Radin, supra note 33, at 1125. Radin identifies the
“contractasconsent” model, with “the meeting of the minds between two
humans.” Her “contractasproduct” model encompasses standards prescribed by
legislatures, industryagreed standardizations, and standards set by technical
bodies such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, that
conceivably embody plural values beyond the parties’ consent. Id.
64. Radin, supra note 33.
65. On such ‘‘expressive liberty,’’ see GALSTON, supra note 23.
66. On the tendency of modern common law judges to objectify consent, see,
for example, SLAWSON, supra note 57, at 2021.
67. The Restatement Second of Contracts adopts a refined checklist in
determining the “mutual assent” of the parties to contract. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 17, 20, 24, 25 (1979). For Williston’s
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checklist of requirements to substantiate a single prime
value such as in determining whether there is a vice or
defect in the parties’ consent. Once that checklist is
satisfied, it declares that the contract is legally binding and
enforceable.68
A problem with courts applying such a checklist of
requirements to the formation of a contract is that they are
likely to exclude plural values which they construe as
operating external to that checklist. For example, they may
decline to enforce agreements to negotiate in good faith on
grounds that such agreements do not promise any
determinative result.69 In contrast, courts that adopt a
plural theory of contracting can stipulate that a party’s
reasonable reliance on such negotiations are among the
‘‘good faith’’ values that decision agents ought to consider in
determining the nature and scope of a contract.
Such a plural analysis enables decision agents to
ascribe normative properties to a checklist of contract
requirements without having to accord primacy to any one
item on that checklist. For example, a pluralist court
determines whether an “agreement” entered into during the
course of an employment relationship is illusory because it
accords undue discretion over work conditions to a
supervisor after taking account of the relationship between
the supervisor and supervisee—including differences in
their cultural, social, and educational backgrounds.70

comments on such a checklist in the law of sales, see Samuel Williston, The Law
of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1950).
68. On values that are ranked below a single “super” value under legal
monism, see supra Section II.
69. On such good faith duties in contract see, for example, Alan Berg,
Promises to Negotiate in Good Faith, 119 L. Q. REV. 357, 363 (2003). See
generally STEPHEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH:
FORMATION, PERFORMANCE, BREACH, ENFORCEMENT (1995); GOOD FAITH IN
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (Reinhard Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker eds.,
2000); Roger Brownsword, Norma J. Hird, & Geraint Howells, Good Faith in
Contract: Concept and Context, in GOOD FAITH IN CONTRACT: CONCEPT AND
CONTEXT (Roger Brownsword, Norma J. Hird, & Geraint Howells eds., 1995).
70. Such an employment agreement is not selfevidently illusory, as when the
weight of plural analysis leads to the determination that the employee “accepts”
the employer’s exercise of discretion as a hazard associated with employment.
However, that determination does not arise a priori, but depends on the nature
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Judges can also invoke value pluralism to identify,
weigh, and rank checklist requirements, such as the
intention to enter into a marriage agreement against the
fairness value of not enforcing onerous terms in those
agreements to the disadvantage of a dependant spouse.71
They invoke ‘‘decision procedures’’ to isolate arbitrary
distinctions, such as between the “trivial” and “nontrivial”
affairs of a marriage in determining whether the spouses
seriously intended to enter into a maintenance agreement
while living apart.72
Pluralism does not seek explicitly to dissuade decision
agents from ranking checklist requirements selectively, or
even from concealing their underlying value preferences. It
acknowledges that some courts will decline to enforce
agreements between “common law” spouses on grounds of
the absence of an intention to enter into legal relations that
conceal their moralreligious disdain for such unions. What
value pluralism provides is an explanatory context in which
to identify and critique value preferences, including the
failure of decision agents to articulate them adequately.
V. REFRAMING THE BARGAIN
Decision agents who adhere to a monist bargain theory
affirm the free choice of the parties in concluding a bargain
as the determinative measure of their ‘‘expressive liberty.’’73
As an illustration, courts require evidence of a bargained
forexchange, including a benefit to the promisee or a
detriment to the promisor as willed or consented to by the

and significance of that hazard in the plural context under review. Cf. HILLMAN,
supra note 1, at 40.
71. On ‘‘decision procedure’’ pluralism, see supra note 38; see also infra
Section XI.
72. See, e.g., Balfour v. Balfour, (1919) 2 L. Rep. 571, 57475 (K.B.)
(construing a maintenance agreement between spouses as a trivial affair of
marriage and not a contract). On gender stereotyping in employment and family
contracts and conflicts, see Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for
Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and WorkFamily Conflict, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2010).
73. On free choice as a measure of ‘‘expressive liberty,’’ see GALSTON, supra
note 5, at 1011.
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parties.74 Related monist rationales include: that enforcing
the right of the parties to determine their bargain is more
certain, predictable, or efficient than a court “making” or
“unmaking” a bargain.75
A court that subscribes to a nominal conception of
consideration in contracting—that a mere peppercorn has
value—may be monist or pluralist.76 If it grounds a
gratuitous promise in the a priori primacy of the parties’
will or consent, it is likely to subscribe to a monist
conception of nominal consideration. If it decides based on a
plurality of values varying from the parties’ wills or consent
to the values of business efficiency and fairness, it adheres
at least to a dualist or possibly a pluralist conception of
consideration that includes nominal consideration.77 A court
that subscribes to a pluralist bargain theory establishes a
decisional framework within which it identifies and ranks
plural values relating to the bargain, such as values that
relate to bargaining unfairness. It applies these values, in
turn, in deciding whether to enforce a past debt in the
absence of new consideration,78 in contrast to a monist judge
who holds that a past debt gives rise to a moral obligation
only and has no legal effect.79

74. For historical reflection on the ‘‘value’’ of consideration as a bargainedfor
exchange, see Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L.
REV. 929, 92941 (1958).
75. See Robert A. Pollak, Bargaining Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L. J.
POCKET PART 414 (2007), http://yalelawjournal.org/index2.php?option=
com_content&do_pdf=1&id=542.
76. On nominal consideration, see 1 CHITTY ON CONTRACTS § 3 (H.G. Beale
ed., 30th ed. 2008); Robert A. Prentice, “Law &” Gratuitous Promises, 2007 ILL.
L. REV. 881.
77. Such dualism derives from decision agents electing between rightbased
and fairnessbased values in relation to gratuitous or “unbargained” contracts.
On such dualism, see, for example, BERLIN, supra note 7; see also Pollak, supra
note 75. For a challenge to consensus ad idem in socalled “unbargained
contracts,” see Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The Search Interest in Contract, 92 IOWA L.
REV. 1237 (2007).
78. For a classical English case holding that past consideration is not ‘‘good’’
consideration, see Eastwood v. Kenyon (1840), 11 Eng. Rep. 438 (K.B).
79. On categories in which judges allegedly uphold contracts in the absence of
a bargained for exchange, see CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY
OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 28 (1981). Fried identifies four such categories:
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Such a pluralist bargain theory provides courts with a
framework in which to systemically analyze the nature of
bargaining in contracts, to assess structural inequalities
between parties in the process of bargaining, and to develop
functional ways in which to regulate “bargaining
unfairness.”80 It also assists them in deciding how to
circumscribe bargaining inequities, such as in light of
community values that are applied through standards of
detrimental reliance. 81
Plural bargaining theory poses the risk that decision
agents will pick and choose the values by which they assess
the bargain of the parties, leading to bargaining
indeterminacy. If a plural bargain theory is to avoid such
bargaining indeterminacy —leading to a ‘‘nontheory’’ of the
bargain—it needs to delineate the plural parameters of the
bargain in light of competing rightsbased and goodsbased
values. If plural decision makers are to redress “confusion”
or “unfair surprise” in bargaining, they need also take into
account the disparate impact of those values upon both the
bargaining process and the result reached.
VI. THE MORAL DIMENSIONS OF A PROMISE
Moral monism arises in contract theory when decision
agents adopt a prime moral value that trumps all other
values in the formation of contracts.82 For example, moral
including, inter alia, promises to keep an offer open, promises to release a debt,
promises to modify a duty, and promises to pay for past benefits or favors. Id.
80. On the relationship between the bargain and the normative structure of a
contract, see David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of
Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991). But cf. Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 785,
n.121 (1982). On how the normative framework is different in econsumer
transactions, see infra notes 23941 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Mary Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory
Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentation, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443
(1987); see also Kevin M. Teeven, Origins of Promissory Estoppel: Justifiable
Reliance and Commercial Uncertainty Before Williston’s Restatement, 34 U.
MEM. L. REV. 499 (2004). For arguments that there remain instances of injury
and reliance which are unenforceable, see Cohen, supra note 24, at 579.
82. Arguably, a promise that is grounded in morality supersedes the
traditional separation between law and morality by which analytical positivists
hold that only legal promises are enforceable. On the HartFuller debate over
the permanent separation between law and morality, compare H.L.A. Hart,
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monists ground promises in the “rightness” of respecting
one’s promises under a classical liberal theory of
contracting,83 as repopularized by Charles Fried.84 They
couch the “rightness” of promises though such values as the
liberty, freedom, dignity, and mutual respect of the parties,
as explicated through their “liberty to contract.”85
A communitarian ‘‘moral good’’ frames promises in light
of such values as compliance, cooperation, or comity that
are expected of, or imposed upon, the parties and are based
on community standards.86 These standards are most
readily identified with the requirement that promises not
infract upon public policy.87 Most importantly, under a
monist moral theory, either liberal rights or communitarian
conceptions of the moral good prevail. They cannot both
triumph.88
Pluralist courts invoke at least four moral bases in
different combinations in determining whether a promise
ought to be legally binding. First, they hold that promises to
which the parties have morally bound themselves ought to
be enforced. In effect, the parties ought to be bound by
promises they freely and voluntarily assumed.89 Second,
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958)
(favoring the separation), with Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958) [hereinafter Fuller,
Positivism and Fidelity] (challenging the separation). For additional
commentary, see Leslie Green, Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and
Morals, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1035 (2008); Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal
Positivism Reconsidered, 111 ETHICS 278 (2001); Jeremy Waldron, Positivism
and Legality: Hart’s Equivocal Response to Fuller, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135
(2008).
83. On neoliberal theories of contracting, see infra Section VIII.
84. On Fried’s moral theory as it applies to promises, see FRIED, supra note
79.
85. On such liberty to contract, see ATIYAH, supra note 21.
86. On communitarian conceptions of contracting, see infra Section XIV.
87. On public policy, see BUCKLEY, supra note 2.
88. On the moral foundation of promises, see SMITH, supra note 1. On the
moral foundations of freedom of contract in moral philosophy, see ATIYAH, supra
note 21, at 18; DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS 30 (Charles W. Hendel ed., 1957); HENRY MATHER, CONTRACT LAW AND
MORALITY (1999).
89. This moral foundation is closely identified with a wills theory of
contracting. See, e.g., Anthony Kronman, A New Champion for the Wills Theory,
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they enforce promises to protect the reasonable reliance of
one party whose interests are detrimentally impacted by the
failure of another party to keep a promise.90 These two bases
bind the promising party for having “intentionally invoked a
convention whose function is to give grounds—moral
grounds—for another to expect the promised performance.”91
Third, courts force parties to keep their promises, not
only as a measure of honor, respect, and deference to their
promises, but also to maintain moral order in—and respect
for—civil society. The purpose in enforcing such promises is
to avoid affronting public policy or inducing civil disorder.92
Fourth, courts rank and weigh promises according to
theories of justice which they invoke to redress the failure of
parties to keep their promises.93 These theories include:
compensating parties who suffer loss arising from default,
extracting retribution from promising parties, deterring
future default, or seeking some other morallegal end such
as restorative justice.94
91 YALE L.J. 404, 40405 (1981) (reviewing CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS
PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981)). On the theoretical
underpinnings of binding promises in contract law, see SLAWSON, supra note 57,
at 21; see also Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the
Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989). For a classical treatment
of moral pluralism, see MOORE, supra note 12; see also KEKES, supra note 11;
LARMORE, supra note 11.
90. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
91. FRIED, supra note 79, at 16; cf. Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract
Be Immoral?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1551 (2009). But see Craswell, supra note 89;
Frederick Green, Is an Offer Always a Promise; Is Not Consideration Always an
Act of Forbearance?, 23 ILL. L. REV. 95, 9597 (1928).
92. See generally FRANK HEARN, MORAL ORDER AND SOCIAL DISORDER: THE
AMERICAN SEARCH FOR CIVIL SOCIETY (1997); DAVID SELBOURNE, THE PRINCIPLE
OF DUTY: AN ESSAY ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVIC ORDER (1994).
93. See, e.g., Stephen A. Smith, Performance, Punishment and the Nature of
Contractual Obligation, 60 MOD. L. REV. 360 (1997) (exploring the moral
consequences of not punishing efficient breach and the limitations on remedies
in a breach of contract dispute in terms of public policy). See generally GOOD
FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds.,
1997).
94. While one normally thinks of tort law as compensating parties who suffer
losses, extracting retribution from wrongdoers, and deterring future
undesirable behavior, conceptions of fault in tort law that impact on contract
law. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES ch. 2 (1990); Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract
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Under a theory of moral monism, any one of these moral
values can serve as the ‘‘super’’ value that determines
whether a promise ought to be legally binding. That moral
value then trumps other values, not limited to values
grounded in morality.95 As an illustration, a judge who
subscribes to a classical liberal theory of morality in a
society of free and voluntary moral agents would insist that
honoring one’s promises resides at the apex of the legal
order, to which other moral values are subordinated. A
court entertaining community values would maintain that
honoring one’s promises is contingent on such values as
maintaining social order.96
A problem with moral monism is that it invites decision
agents to establish a moral hierarchy, such as the moral
superiority of “keeping one’s word”, to which they subject
other moral values. A difficulty with this approach is that
the choice of one prime moral value among competing
alternatives—not limited to moral options—fosters
intractable disputes over those options in the formation of
contracts. For example, one decision agent holds that
binding a minor to pay for the services of a guardian if the
minor so consents to becoming an adult is morally
questionable. Another insists that the assurance by minors
of ex post payment for those services is in the public interest
Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 834 (1983) (“contract law is like tort law and . . .
judicial action is like legislative action: all necessarily involve public policy
judgments in imposing legal liability.”); Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability
Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1389 (2007). For a discussion of restorative justice, see sources cited infra note
236.
95. The bases for promises in moral theory are many and varied. See P.S.
ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 177 (1981); BUCKLEY, JUST EXCHANGE,
supra note 1, at 5160; THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: CONNECTIONS AND BOUNDARIES
(Andrew Robertson ed., 2004). Moral rights and economic efficiency theories,
however, are not mutually exclusive. See Oman, supra note 19, at 1484
(espousing a “reconciliation of competing approaches”).
96. For a libertarian rationale for the morally binding nature of promises, see
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 503 (1974); Cass R. Sunstein &
Richard H. Thaler, Preferences, Paternalism, and Liberty, 81 ROYAL INST. PHIL.
SUPP.
233
(2006)
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?
fromPage=online&aid=457780. For the argument that a lack of clarity in legal
standards may enrich moral deliberations, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin,
Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 1214 (2010).
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including the welfare interests of minors. The problem is
not that theories of moral ‘‘righteousness’’ and moral
‘‘goodness’’ ought to coincide in the formation of contracts.
The problem is in treating one moral conception as a super
or prime value that transcends the other.97
A related concern is that moral monism simplifies
morallegal deliberations. For example, a ‘‘contract as
promise’’ theory of morality regresses into a proxy for a
monist wills or consent theory of contracting. In effect, the
wills or consent of the parties determines when their
agreement is binding on moral grounds.98 A further risk is of
moral monism marginalizing “fairness” values. A court that
declares a promise binding to protect the reasonable
reliance of the promisee may do little more than reframe
promissory estoppel on moral grounds.99
Under a theory of moral pluralism, moral decision
making derives not from the supremacy of one prime moral
value over all others, but from identifying, ranking, and
weighing a plurality of moral values in order to reach a
morally defensible determination that is inclusive, not
exclusive. Such a plural assessment includes recognizing
the ‘‘rightness’’ of keeping one’s promises, along with the
‘‘goodness’’ value of not enforcing promises that “unfairly
surprise,” or cause “undue hardship” to one party. For
example, a court that declines to enforce a complex
liquidated damage clause in a contract does so not simply
because it “looks like” a penalty, but only after it has
assessed the “confusion,” “surprise,” and “hardship” on the
party subject to that clause.100

97. On these moral dilemma, see generally SLAWSON, supra note 57;
TREBILCOCK, supra note 1. But cf. DAVID FELLMAN, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM
(Greenwood Press, Publishers 1979) (1959).
98. On the view that Charles Fried’s theory of ‘‘contract as promise’’ is a wills
theory, see Kronman, supra note 89, at 404.
99. On the detrimental reliance arising from a promissory estoppel, see supra
note 73. But cf. HILLMAN, supra note 1, at 5255.
100. For Charles Fried’s recognition that courts may construe contracts
expansively on grounds of fairness in the absence of contract as promise, see
FRIED, supra note 79, at 25. See also Brian Langille and Arthur Ripstein,
‘‘Strictly Speaking—It Went Without Saying,’’ 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 63 (1996);
Andrew J. Morris, Practical Reasoning and Contract as Promise: Extending
ContractBased Criteria to Decide Excuse Cases, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 147 (1997).
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A concern about courts applying moral pluralism to the
formation of contracts is the risk of decisions regressing into
endless discourse over the relative weight of contractual
“righteousness” or “virtue.” If a promise becomes captive to
the vagaries of judicial belief, faith, decency, honor, courage,
or some other conception of the “right” or the “good,” moral
abstractions triumph, leading to formless decisions.101
Courts will declare promises binding based on an
assortment of incongruous judicial conceptions of
distributive, punitive, corrective, and restorative justice.102
They will encapsulate an infinite variety of moral
determinations beyond deterring the unconscionable
treatment of consumers, or the systemic denial of corrective
justice to minorities in the workforce.103 The concern is that
morality will run amuck and contract formation along with
it.104
101. For a view promoting the “priority” of the right over the good, see
TRAKMAN & GATIEN, supra note 4, at chs. 12. For a view promoting the
“priority” of the good over the right, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE
LIMITS OF JUSTICE 11323 (1982). For additional commentary, see W.D. ROSS,
THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (1930); J.J. Thomson, The Right and the Good, 94 J.
PHIL. 273 (1997).
102. On moral determinism in relation to law, see, for example, Fuller,
Positivism and Fidelity, supra note 82, at 63038. For a critique of morally open
ended judicial activism by “new legal formalists,” see, for example, Lisa
Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996). For a critique of
moral pluralism in liberal thought, see, for example, JOSEPH H. CARENS,
CULTURE, CITIZENSHIP, AND COMMUNITY: A CONTEXTUAL EXPLORATION OF JUSTICE
AS EVENHANDEDNESS (2000); DAVID LEWIS SCHAEFER, ILLIBERAL JUSTICE: JOHN
RAWLS VS. THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 2833 (2007).
103. The basis for such corrective justice lies in the assertion that systemic
discrimination is best redressed through systemic remediation. The problem is
in determining the nature and extent of that remediation contextually, without
regressing into an unqualified assertion that corrective justice is determined
quantitatively only. For an example, by hiring and paying more to minorities,
without addressing underlying qualitative concerns such as work conditions
that systemically disadvantage minorities. For reflection on such issues in civil
justice, see, for example, Daniel N. Lipson, Where's the Justice? Affirmative
Action's Severed Civil Rights Roots in the Age of Diversity, 6 PERSP. ON POL. 691
(2008).

104. For the proposition that, before a contract and promise can correspond, it
is necessary first to provide a theory of selfimposed moral responsibility, see
Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
1603 (2009).

1056

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

What moral pluralism can offer is a conceptual
framework within which to consider the moral alternatives,
as well as their perceived moral implications. For example,
if the issue is about the enforceability of a sale of body parts
for research, moral pluralism cannot provide a prepackaged
answer to whether it is per se ‘‘immoral’’ to sell body parts.
However, it can help to identify, weigh, and rank moral
values such as circumspection over profiteering in body
parts, compared to encouraging the donation of body parts
to maintain lifeenhancing research. A decision agent may
conclude that however objectionable the sale of body parts is
in principle, such sales are morally defensible in discrete
contexts such as by taking account of the terms of the sale
including the parties, the price, and the public benefit.
Far from embroiling itself in moral indeterminacy,
pluralism
accommodates
morally
defensible
value
determinations not on their own terms, but in response to
the moral values that are identified, ranked, and applied.
Consider the provision in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts stating that reliance upon a promise should be
‘‘reasonabl[e] . . . as justice requires.’’105 In the absence of a
sustained plural analysis, the moral dimension of
reasonableness ‘‘as justice requires’’ invites an infinite array
of ways in which to recast the objective moral person into a
legally determinate person.106 Examining these different
moral dimensions is precisely what moral pluralism seeks
to do. In particular, moral pluralism recognizes that the
objectively ‘‘moral’’ person, far from being irreversibly fixed,
may include someone who, through the act and consequence
of promising, is bound by the dictates of conscience to act
justly, build relations of trust with others, and contribute to
a defensible moral ‘‘good.’’ Moral pluralism entails
identifying, weighing, and ranking these moral attributes in

105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1979).
106. For criticisms of reliance on openended conceptions of fairness in
arriving at contract remedies, see IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT:
AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 62 (1980). But see HILLMAN,
supra note 1, at 12931 (identifying distinct norms of fairness by which courts
decide cases, such as in allocating performance losses). See generally Robert A.
Hillman, Court Adjustment of LongTerm Contracts: An Analysis Under Modern
Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L. J. 1.
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order to determine whether enforcing a promises is
‘‘reasonable . . . as justice requires.’’107
Moral pluralism cannot provide an a priori account that
a unified moral conception ought to apply in all cases any
more than any rightsbased and goodsbased theories can
pretend to do so. However, moral pluralism can explore the
moral alternatives without holding that one moral good is
invariably superior to all others in the formation of
contracts.
VII. SELF OR PUBLIC REGULATION?
A theory of contract regulation entails selfregulation by
the parties, regulation by public authorities, or some blend
of the two.108 At issue is why, when, and how self and public
regulation apply to contract formation, how they interact,
who decides, and according to what criteria.109
A theory of selfregulation in contracting is usually
monist. For example, the assumption in a liberal society is
that contracting parties ought to be free to regulate their
own affairs by their own means, such as according to their
wills, consent, or promises.110 However, the nature of their
selfregulation may conceivably be contingent on a plurality
of values including their knowledge, desire, dignity,
character, solidarity, reputation and sense of community,
beyond their unitary wills, consent, or promises.111

107. Cf. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Role of Fault in Contract Law:
Unconscionability, Unexpected Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, and
Nonperformance, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2009).
108. See, e.g., HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 57 (1999); Jean
Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract
Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 712 (1990).
109. See Braucher, supra note 108. For a thoughtful analysis on the
interaction between self and public regulation in a democracy, see generally
CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELFREGULATION AND
DEMOCRACY (2002).
110. On how contracts can be invoked in governing social interaction, see
COLLINS, supra note 108, at 70 (citing Laura Nader, Disputing Without the Force
of Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998, 1021 (1979)). On free choice, see supra Section II.
111. The risk in a plural theory of selfregulation is in determining the plural
qualifications for such selfregulation. For example, if knowledge and reputation
are preferred values, a potentially insidious inference is that only
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Public regulation of contracts requires that contracts
are regulated by decision agents beyond the parties, varying
from legislators and administrative agencies to courts of law
and arbitrators. Public regulation can be based on monist or
pluralist values. As an illustration of monism in public
regulation: consider the legislature that declares illegal the
sale of flickblade or switchblade knives to minors on
grounds of public interest in deterring their access to and
use of dangerous weapons. That regulation is monist,
ascribing primacy to deterrence as the determinative value
in regulating such sales. 112
Courts, in turn, apply regulatory schemes both in
accordance with legislative or other guidelines and through
common law instruments. For example, judges employ
traditional principles of economic duress,113 applicable
standards
of
procedural
and
substantive
unconscionability,114 and rules of construction like the
contra proferentem rule selectively in determining whether
to enforce a contract.115 If the legislative guidelines so direct,
or the adjudicative and social facts so demonstrate, judges
impute immutable impliedinlaw terms into contracts

knowledgeable people and people with a public reputation ought to regulate
their own affairs.
112. From a legal perspective, see infra Section XIV; see also BUCKLEY, supra
note 2.
113. See, e.g., John P. Dawson, Economic Duress—An Essay in Perspective, 45
MICH. L. REV. 253 (1947); Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic
Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943).
114. On the rationale for such judicial scrutiny on grounds of procedural
unconscionability, see, for example, Gatton v. TMobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr.
3d 344, 352 (Ct. App. 2007) (“Oppression [for purposes of rendering a contract
provision procedurally unconscionable] arises from an inequality of bargaining
power that results in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice.”),
quoting A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal.App.3d 473, 486 (Ct. App.
1982). But see Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About
Unconscionability: A New Framework for U.C.C. Section 2302, 67 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (1981).
115. On the contra proferentem rule, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 206 (1981); 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 342 (2004); 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON &
RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 32:12 (4th ed. 1999 &
Supp. 2005).
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based on values of fairness, evenhandedness, or other
variants of social justice.116
A plural theory of public regulation does not propose
that regulators such as legislatures and courts engage in
extraordinary inquiry beyond their regulatory mandate.
What it does envisage is that decision makers transparently
assess the malady that is subject to regulation, the purposes
sought through regulation, and the competing plural means
that are invoked to redress that malady and attain the
regulatory purposes. As an illustration, uniform law
commissioners already explore different regulatory policies
governing enduser consumer transactions. They design
regulatory schemes that balance competing values such as
preserving free market ecommerce and measures designed
to redress inefficient or unfair contract practices.117 They
take account of the systemic use of confusing or incomplete
product description clauses in determining whether and
how to regulate them.118 In doing so, decision agents focus
on such partyspecific factors as the significance of esellers
having deeper pockets, more bargaining leverage, and
greater legal sophistication than ebuyers.119 They consider
price and nonprice competition, such as the alleged market
dysfunctions arising from the online sale of complex
products like computers, the recurrence of product defects,

116. On such immutable impliedinlaw terms, see supra Section III.
117. On the regulatory framework behind contract law, see, for example, Jean
Braucher, Cowboy Contracts: The Arizona Supreme Court’s Grand Tradition of
Transactional Fairness, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 191 (2008); Jean Braucher, New Basics:
Twelve Principles for Fair Commerce in MassMarket Software and Other
Digital Products, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE ‘‘INFORMATION
ECONOMY’’ 177 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006).
118. See generally Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Antisocial Contracts: The
Contractual Governance of Virtual Worlds, 53 MCGILL L.J. 427 (2008). For
reflections on plural conceptions of contract regulation in a complex sociolegal
order, see GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).
119. It is easier to determine the percentage of consumers who bring suit in
response to complex exclusion and limitation of liability clauses than those
consumers who understand them. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson,
Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 683, 687 (1993).
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and the implementation of risk avoidance measures to
contracts under scrutiny.120
In engaging in such plural analysis, public regulators
assess competing legislative measures in otherwise similar
contexts. For example, they consider value contestations
over the public regulation of ‘‘straightjacket’’ clauses
prohibiting class actions against esellers, and contract
clauses mandating arbitration in the eseller’s home state.121
They evaluate such countervailing factors as the extent to
which ebuyers have access to consumer protection agencies,
public advocacy measures, and fasttrack arbitration.122
They appreciate that the more complex the malady,
purpose, and response to formation of contract issues under
examination, the more complex is likely to be the inquiry
into public regulation.
Plural inquiry into public regulation is not without
pitfalls. Public regulators are likely to diverge over the
suitability of particular regulatory measures, ‘‘decision
procedures’’ by which to implement them,123 and over the

120. For a legal realist critique of fine print clauses in adhesion contracts, see
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960)
(“The fine print which has not been read has no business to cut under the
reasonable meaning of those dickered terms which constitute the dominant and
only real expression of agreement . . . .”).
121. For a critique of forum selection clauses in ecommerce, see , for example,
Brower v. Gateway, 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 57475 (App. Div. 1998)
(finding a forum selection clause unconscionable). On concerns over choice of
arbitration clauses in contracts, see Jonnette Watson Hamilton, PreDispute
Consumer Arbitration Clauses: Denying Access to Justice?, 51 MCGILL L.J. 693,
69596 (2006); Sajida A. Mahdi, Gateway to Arbitration: Issues of Contract
Formation Under the U.C.C. and the Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses
Included in Standard Form Contracts Shipped with Goods, 96 NW. U. L. REV.
403, 418 (2001); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, JuryWaiver Clauses,
and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 167 (2004); see also Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard
Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 430 (2002).
122. A converse indicator is ‘‘herd behavior’’ among consumers. Cf. Marcel
Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 347,
353–57 (1996); David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and
Investment, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 465, 466 (1990).
123. On such cultural influences over plural decision making, see infra Section
XIV.
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nature, timing and extent of regulatory reform.124
Illustrating such divergences among regulators was the
failure of the Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act (“UCITA”), devised by the Commissioners on Uniform
State Law, to secure state endorsement beyond Maryland
and Virginia.125 In contention, among other factors, were
differences among state authorities over the manner in
which to regulate such econtracts as ‘‘clickwrap’’ and
“browsewrap” econtracts,126 and how to scrutinize clauses
within them such as those that limit the product liability of
esuppliers.127
Courts also likely differ over the nature and limits of
public regulation over the formation of contracts. Take the
case of the choices available to courts in determining
whether to enforce limitation of warranty liability clauses in
discount consumer contracts. One determination is to hold
that unbargained ‘‘takeitorleaveit’’ clause should be
enforced on evidence that sellers discount prices to mass
consumers, consumers expressly or tacitly agree to such
clauses, and their use reduces transaction costs. A contrary
determination is that the evidence is stronger that takeit
124. See, e.g., COLLINS, supra note 108, at 28.
125. The UCITA was initially framed as Draft Article 2B207 and 208 of the
UCC. In 2003, after various efforts to have states adopt it, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law suspended efforts to obtain
further state adoptions beyond Maryland and Virginia that had already adopted
it. On the UCITA, see Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform
Computer Information Act (Feb. 9, 2000), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
archives/ulc/ucita/ucita200.pdf [hereinafter UCITA].
126. Clickwrap contracts include conditions of sale at the end of the
agreement where the epurchaser is asked to tick an ‘‘I agree’’ box consenting to
the purchase. Browsewrap contracts provide epurchasers with a hyperlink to
another screen containing those terms. See Dale Clapperton & Stephen Corones,
Unfair Terms in ‘‘Clickwrap’’ and other Electronic Contracts, 35 AUSTL. BUS. L.
REV. 152 (2007); Kaustuv M. Das, ForumSelection Clauses in Consumer
Clickwrap and Browsewrap Agreements and the ‘‘Reasonably Communicated’’
Test, 77 WASH. L. REV. 481, 500 (2002); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 121,
at 493; see also Leon E. Trakman, The Boundaries of Contract Law in
Cyberspace, INT’L BUS. L.J. 161 (2009).
127. See UCITA, supra note 125. Notwithstanding dissension among
regulators, new mandatory rules have evolved that govern the use of new
technologies in ecommerce. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate:
Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of EStandard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV.
837 (2006).
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orleaveit clauses are unduly onerous, that they unfairly
surprise consumers, that sellers do not discount prices
adequately in fact, and that such clauses increase
transaction costs for consumers who receive defective
products with limited warranty protection.
The purpose of a plural analysis is to inform regulatory
policies in light of values like security, reliability, and
fairness between contracting parties, without subjecting
different form contracts to a onesizefitsall regulatory
scheme that relies on static regulatory norms. The intention
is for public regulators to periodically review measures to
assess regulatory deficiencies such as the absence of market
compliance or other evidence of ineffectiveness
or
unfairness; and to take account of changes in horizontal and
vertical integration among buyers and sellers in the
regulatory context. A related goal is to ameliorate
regulatory measures in markets that are predominantly
horizontally integrated, as when buyers expressly or tacitly
agree not to dicker over warranty exclusion clauses in
return for sustainable benefits. Regulators can also refine
regulatory measures in vertically integrated markets in
which warranty exclusion clauses unfairly surprise
consumers or impose undue hardship upon them as a class
or within subclasses.128
VIII. FROM DISCRETE TRANSACTIONS TO RELATIONAL
CONTRACTS
A distinction is sometimes drawn between discrete
transactions
and
relational
contracts.129
Discrete
transactions resemble ‘‘classical’’ agreements in which the
parties engage in oneoff transactions that are monist in
nature. What you see is what you get, a hermetically sealed
unitary theory of contracting grounded in the wills,

128. On subcategorization of consumers, such as distinguishing between one
off, repeat order, and purchaseforresale consumers, see Trakman, supra note
126. On the interface between plural regulatory policies in contracting and
functionalism, see infra Section XI.
129. For a discussion by Ian Macneil, a key figure in developing the relational
contracts perspective, see MACNEIL, supra note 106, at 10. See also James W.
Fox Jr., Relational Contract Theory and Democratic Citizenship, 54 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1, 57 (2003).
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intention, or consent of the parties.130 The discrete
transaction includes all the applicable terms and conditions
of the agreement between the parties. Such discrete
transactions
encompass
traditional
partytoparty
transactions such as between traditional buyers and
sellers.131 They also include mass market consumer
transactions in which a mass market seller uses a series of
standardized transactions in dealing with a mass of
consumers.132
Relational contracts involve ongoing dealings between
parties including the impact of periodic changes in their
contractual relationships, such as arise from modifications
over time and space in the nature of the goods and the
quantity, price, and terms of delivery. Such relational
contracts typically include parties engaged in longterm
supply agreements, such as an oil company and its
distributors.133
It is arguable that discrete transactions and relational
contracts are both monist. The supposition is that both are
explained by a monist conception of consent, although
relational consent is more widely conceived than discrete
consent. The result is that the judiciary’s role is merely to
determine the nature of consent according to its place on a
continuum from discrete transactions to relational

130. See MACNEIL, supra note 106.
131. Id.; see also Fox, supra note 129, at 5.
132. The distinction between discrete transactions and relational contracts is
not universally endorsed. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There is No Law of
Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 81617 (2000). But see Donald J.
Smythe, Bounded Rationality, the Doctrine of Impracticability, and the
Governance of Relational Contracts, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 227, 23031
(2004); Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational
Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 823 (2000).
133. See generally, Ian R. Macneil, Contracting Worlds and Essential Contract
Theory, 9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 431 (2000) [hereinafter Macneil, Contracting
Worlds] (discussing relational contract theory); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:
Adjustment of LongTerm Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical,
and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1978) [hereinafter Macneil,
Contracts] (discussing some of the traits of relational contracts); Ian R. Macneil,
Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 877
(2000) [hereinafter Macneil, Relational Contract Theory] (defining relational
contracts).
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contracts.134 According to this approach, a court is likely to
treat consent to contract as the applicable ‘‘super’’ value,
supported by a hierarchy of lesser values deriving from the
cultural background, political affiliation, and socioeconomic
situation of the parties. The difference between such
discrete transactions and relational contracts is merely one
of degree, notably in the prospect of a court placing greater
reliance on cooperative dealings between the parties at the
relational than the discrete end of the spectrum.135
A contrary approach is that discrete transactions and
relational contracts are fundamentally different in kind,
beyond differences of degree. Discrete transactions are
monist, whereas relational contracts are pluralist. A
discrete transaction is formed at the precise moment at
which the parties consent; namely, at the time of their
accord and satisfaction.136 A discrete transaction is
unenforceable, in turn, when there is evidence of a vice or
defect in the wills, promise, or consent of those parties.137
In contrast, a relational contract engages a range of
plural values arising out of a continually evolving—
progressing or regressing—relationship.138 Those changes
134. The continuum arguably treats relational contracts as monist, not
pluralist. For example, consent may remain a ‘‘super’’ value. All that changes on
entering the relational part of the continuum is that the ‘‘fairness’’ and
‘‘goodness’’ values are acknowledged without displacing the monist supervalue
of, say, the wills or promises of the parties. In some respects, laws that have
evolved to govern adhesion contracts are grounded in monism in seeking to
remedy the imperfect consent of consumers faced with ‘‘take it or leave it’’
standard form contracts. The justification for such laws is attributed, in part, to
systemic market forces, involving inherent bargaining imbalances between the
parties, such as between mass market producers and mass consumers. In part,
the rationale for such laws responds to vices in the consent of consumers who do
not fully understand—and are not meant to understand—onerous provisions in
such contracts. For classical commentary on these two forces—the abuse of
bargaining advantage on the one hand and defects in consent on the other—see
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 28.
135. On the judicial construction of consent under a continuum or spectrum
approach, see supra Section IV.
136. Such a discrete transaction is identified with the classical wills theory of
contracting, as well as with traditional consent theories. See supra Sections II &
III, respectively.
137. On the ‘‘single moment’’ theory of consent, see infra note 141; see also
Fairfield, supra note 77, at 126063.
138. See Fairfield, supra note 77, at 126063.
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are contingent on the plural context surrounding each
relationship, such as arising from supply shortages that
impact relations between suppliers and distributors.139
The argument that an analysis of relational contracts is
pluralist includes evidence of judges identifying, weighing,
and applying competing ‘‘rightness’’ and ‘‘goodness’’ values
to contract relationships.140 For example, they adopt
‘‘decision procedures’’ that transcend the wills or consent of
the parties, that avoid relying on a ‘‘single moment’’ at
which a contract is concluded, and that take account of
variations in the wills and consent of the parties over the
duration of their longterm relationship.141 Typifying
relational pluralism is the readiness of courts to value the
cultural, economic, and political context surrounding
contract relationships, such as the capacity of oil suppliers
to anticipate disruptions in oil supplies during energy
crises, to draw on oil reserves to redress shortages, and to
renegotiate oil prices with other sources of supply.142
Plural decision agents are also likely to limit the impact
of monist values they consider illfitting to a changing long
term relationship.143 In doing so, decision agents are likely
to assess the mutual trust, confidence, goodwill, and
reputations of the parties and the extent to which they
collaborate in reaching ‘‘winner take some’’ rather than
139. An inference arising from Ian Macneil’s The New Social Contract is that
the socialization of relational contracts renders them pluralist in nature. See
MACNEIL, supra note 106, at 6970.
140. On the implicit recognition of interacting plural values exemplifying ‘‘law
in action,’’ see, for example, Stewart Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical
Pictures, and the Complexities of Contract, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 507, 52122
(1977); Stewart Macaulay, The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of
Relationships, Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules, 66 MOD.
L. REV. 44 (2003) [hereinafter Macaulay, The Real and the Paper Deal].
141. On the parameters of a ‘‘single moment’’ theory of consent, see E. Allan
Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing
and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 220 (1987).
142. Engaging in plural value determinism is implicit in establishing when
and how to ‘‘adjust’’ longterm relationships. See, e.g., Macneil, Contracts, supra
note 133, at 89596, 898.
143. Courts may also be ‘‘activist’’ in policing discrete transactions, for
example in responding to the perceived abuse of differences in bargaining power
between the discrete parties, while still being monist in subscribing to consent
or promise as a ‘‘super’’ value. See supra note 37.
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‘‘winner take all’’ resolutions of their differences. Such an
analysis involves courts identifying an amalgam of values
varying from the express promises of the parties to their
behavioral attitudes and relational practices in determining
whether to enforce a price escalation clause in a supply
contract.144
Take
Westinghouse’s
celebrated
commercial
impracticability case in 1981.145 Westinghouse, a longterm
supplier of uranium, sought an excuse from its uranium
supply contracts with its relational buyers on grounds of
unforeseen increases in prices arising beyond its control
that were not expressly provided for by contract.146 In issue
was whether Westinghouse was entitled to relief from
performance only as provided expressly by contract;147 or
whether it could claim an excuse from performance by
operation of law due to ‘‘commercial impracticability’’ under
section 2615 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”).148
After protracted hearings, the court appointed a special
master to try to broker a resolution between the parties
which, in effect, it incorporated into its decision.149

144. On giveandtake solutions to relational disputes, see generally Trakman,
supra note 40 (providing various examples).
145. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (In re Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig.) (Westinghouse), 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D.
Va. 1981), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 826 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1987).
146. Id. at 452, 454. Westinghouse, again, illustrates the difficulties in
determining the foresight of parties and the foresight that ought ‘‘reasonably’’ to
be attributed to them. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the
Uranium Market and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 157–58
(1977).
147. See Westinghouse, 517 F. Supp. at 45859; cf. Eisenberg, supra note 132,
at 817 (disputing the existence of a law governing relational contracts).
148. Westinghouse, 517 F. Supp. at 450.
149. The appointment of a special master to resolve complex issues of fact is
far more common in tort litigation than in contracts. See, Symposium, Judge
Jack B. Weinstein, Tort Litigation, and the Public Good: A Roundtable
Discussion to Honor One of America’s Great Tiral Judges on the Occasion of His
80th Birthday, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 149, 169 (2003). The criticism that such an
appointment in contracts offends the consensual nature of agreements may be
offset in part by the difficulty courts may have in resolving complex relational
disputes. See, e.g., Macaulay, The Real and the Paper Deal, supra note 140;
Trakman, supra note 40.
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An argument that the court adhered to a monist
position is the proposition that it decided, in significant
measure, according to the consent of the parties. That
consent was expressed not only through any original
contract between the parties, but through a special master
who brokered mutually acceptable terms between them.
The result was that the court supervised a postdispute
agreement between the parties.
A contrary argument is that the Westinghouse court
decided on relational grounds that transcended any
brokered ‘‘consent’’ between the parties. The court explored
and reached a practical, efficient, and fair solution based on
the ongoing relationship between them within a volatile
macropolitical and economic environment.150 However much
the remedy coopted the parties’ value preferences through
the good offices of a special master, it transcended the wills,
promises, and consent of the parties. In effect, the result
took account of changes in the complex relationship between
Westinghouse and its customers including intervening
political and economic circumstances that destabilized the
oil supply market.151
Both monist and pluralist approaches to relational
contracting have limitations. A monist court is subject to
challenge for undue temerity in declining to take account of
plural factors, so as not to circumvent the express wills or
consent of the parties.152 A court that incorporates relational
considerations into its decisions is prone to undue audacity
in sublimating the formation of contracts to relational

150. In issue, for example, is whether the longterm supplier could have
averted or mitigated the risk that eventuated, such as through stockpiling
supplies, earmarking alternative suppliers, continuing supplies in reduced
quantities, etc. See Westinghouse, 517 F. Supp. 440.
151. See Richard E. Speidel, CONTRACTS IN CRISES: EXCUSE DOCTRINE AND
RETROSPECTIVE GOVERNMENT ACTS 3 (2007); see also Mark B. Baker, ‘‘A Hard
Rain’s AGonna Fall’’—Terrorism and Excused Contractual Performance in a
Post September 11th World, 17 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 1, 20–21 (2004) (discussing the
effect of the September 11th terrorist attacks on excused contractual
performance).
152. Judges of this genre could be called “trimmers,” by seeking to avoid
political conflict over controversial issues. See Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming, 122
HARV. L. REV. 1049, 105354 (2009).
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economics and politics.153 The overriding issue relates to
neither the temerity of judges in preserving the prime value
of the wills or consent of the parties, nor to their audacity in
superimposing relational considerations upon such
contracts. In issue are the normative values judges
attribute to complex commercial dealings, including
inferences drawn about changes in trust, confidence,
solidarity, and goodwill between the parties over the course
of their relationship.
The result reached in the Westinghouse case is also one
among a number of possible plural results. Key issues in
reaching a plural determination is the need to identify the
significance of a dysfunctional horizontal relationship, not
to become a supplicant of one party to that relationship, and
not peremptorily to transform a horizontal into a vertically
integrated relationship.154
IX. THE LIMITS OF EFFICIENCY
Almost a legend in its own time is the idealized value of
‘‘efficiency’’ in the formation and performance of contracts.155
Ascribed to ‘‘Law and Economics,’’ a contract is efficient
when it maximizes upon profits or produces benefits that
outweigh its costs.156 Expressed in contractual terms, parties
benefit most by concluding efficient—optimal or profitable—
153. Coopting party participation in relational decision making also
presupposes that the court will endorse the remedy proposed by the parties. See
supra Section VII.
154. On horizontal and vertically integrated relationships, see supra Oman,
note 19.
155. On Law and Economics, see, for example, VERNON VALENTINE PALMER &
MAURO BUSSANI, PURE ECONOMIC LOSS: NEW HORIZONS IN COMPARATIVE LAW
(2009); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (Aspen Publishers 7th
ed. 2007) (1972); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Change,
Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 367 (1980);
Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 1581 (2005) [hereinafter Posner, Contract Interpretation]; see also
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 559 (2006); Adam J. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories of Common Law
Efficiency: Reasons for (Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 425, 429–30
(2005); Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A
SupplySide Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551 (2003).
156. For a classical conception of the social cost of inefficient contracting, see
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 31 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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contracts.157 Such ‘‘efficiency’’ is usually ascribed to neo
liberal principles grounded in free market economics and
rooted in utilitarian philosophy.158
Law and Economics is founded on preference monism. A
single but comprehensive value—efficiency—is conceived as
determinative in the formation of contracts. The guiding
assumption is that courts attribute different properties to
efficiency, so long as efficiency serves as the determinative
‘‘super’’ value.159
A further Law and Economics assumption is that
parties to a contract are presumed to make efficient choices
within competitive markets in order to maximize benefits
and minimize costs.160 Richard Epstein proclaimed: “[s]urely
all transactions made in organized markets at competitive
prices must go unquestioned, for to hold one of these
exchanges suspect would be to strike down all identical
transactions.”161
A less selfevident assumption is that, in markets that
are not organized and in which prices are not competitively
determined, courts are more likely to question the utility,
costs, and benefits of the exchange between the parties.
Their purpose, again, is to promote efficient transacting, but
by taking into account that a party in an imperfect market
157. Arguably, there are multiple measures of efficiency. For example,
Coleman asserts that ‘‘Economists as well as proponents of the economic
analysis of law employ at least four efficiencyrelated notions, including: (1)
Productive efficiency, (2) Pareto optimality, (3) Pareto superiority, and (4)
KaldorHicks efficiency.’’ Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth
Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 512 (1980).
158. On the neoclassical liberal—and libertarian—foundations of Law and
Economics, see ANDREW GAMBLE, HAYEK: THE IRON CAGE OF LIBERTY (1996); Paul
G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right,
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001); see also JOHN GRAY, HAYEK ON LIBERTY 40 (1984).
159. Efficiency as a measure of ‘‘preference monism’’ is founded on ‘‘preference
utilitarianism.’’ On Stuart Mills’ ‘‘preference utilitarianism,’’ see, for example,
MILL supra note 5, at 241; FREDERICK ROSEN, CLASSICAL UTILITARIANISM FROM
HUME TO MILL (2003); Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Why No ‘‘Efficient Breach’’ in the
Civil Law?: A Comparative Assessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of
Contract, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 721 (2007).
160. See Posner, Contract Interpretation, supra note 155, at 158283.
161. Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1717, 1748 (1982).
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may be “misled as to . . . the true benefits and costs of the
deal.”162
Courts that subscribe to an efficiency analysis
ordinarily presuppose that they are required to redress the
costs of inefficient contracting.163 They devise default rules
that minimize on opportunistic behavior, that discourage
one party from exerting improper pressure on another,164
that cure market disruptions,165 and that elaborate on
contractual conditions which the parties failed to consider
themselves in forming their contracts.166 Evidence of courts
addressing these partytoparty costs include, among other
factors, judicial consideration of cost inefficiencies in
contracting and the transaction and opportunity cost of one
party exploiting a bargaining advantage at the expense of
another.167

162. Michael I. Myerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and
Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 589 (1990) (“A party misled
as to the utility to be derived from a proposed transaction cannot properly
evaluate the true benefits and costs of the deal.’’).
163. On whether efficiency costs should be measured subjectively or
objectively, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY IN ECONOMIC
THEORY 126 (Markham Publ’g Co. 1969); G.F. Thirlby, The Subjective Theory of
Value and Accounting ‘‘Cost,’’ in L.S.E. ESSAYS ON COST 135 (J.M. Buchanan &
G.F. Thirlby eds., 1981).
164. On these justifications for judicial intervention in contracts, see Richard
A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 8897 (1977); Samuel
A. Rea, Jr., Nonpecuniary Loss and Breach of Contract, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 36
(1982).
165. On a quasiefficiency analysis holding the ship owner liable for a
performance loss because it was best placed to anticipate the closure of the Suez
Canal and to insure against it, see Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States,
363 F.2d 312, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
166. For argument that onesided consumer contracts may still be efficient if
consumers have market choice, see Lucian A. Bebchuk and Richard A. Posner,
OneSided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827
(2006).
167. For a traditional ‘‘Law and Economic’’ argument holding that judicial
‘‘gap filling’’ may be efficient including in relation to contracts, see RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 44 (1974). But see Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Omri Ben–Shahar, ‘‘Agreeing to Disagree’’: Filling
Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WISC. L. REV. 389, 389.
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A central problem with a monist theory of efficiency is
the hazard that courts will construe efficiency in contracting
as a ‘super’ value to which they will subordinate all
incommensurable values.168 The problem is not that courts
should be discouraged from reaching efficient outcomes, but
rather that they weigh efficiency against potentially
countervailing values, such as unfair surprise to the
promisee, that sometimes are not encompassed within an
efficiency analysis. As an illustration, enforcing a no
warranty clause in a discounted computer sales contract is
conceivably efficient if the buyer is able to purchase a
separate warranty. However, such efficiency is potentially
outweighed by “unfair surprise” to a buyer who receives a
defective computer at the outset and has not chosen to buy a
separate warranty. Making a choice between these
incommensurable options includes decision agents
considering, among other factors, the nature of the vertical
relationship between the discount computer seller and
buyer, including but not limited to reasonable notice given
of that warranty exclusion.169
A Law and Economics decision agent may declare that
an efficiency outcome incorporates the value of ‘‘unfair
surprise’’ to the discount computer buyer. This approach is
only plausible when normative values like ‘‘unfair surprise’’
are reasonably explicated through an efficiency analysis
rather than subjugated by it. In contrast, a decision agent
who adopts a plural analysis identifies ‘‘unfair surprise’’ as

168. On whether efficiency in Law and Economics determines consent to
contract, see James M. Buchanan, Good Economics—Bad Law, 60 VA. L. REV.
483, 489–90 (1974). On default rules that transcend the consent to contract, see
also Omri BenShahar & John A.E. Pottow, On The Stickiness of Default Rules,
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651 (2006).
169. Law and Economics may well address the ‘‘inequity’’ to the computer
buyer as an unreasonable ‘‘transaction cost’’ that justifies setting the contract
aside. But it reduces inequity to an inefficiency cost, such as a transaction cost,
rather than as an independent value that may be incommensurable with
efficiency. See, for example, Judge Posner’s decision in Carr v. CIGNA Sec., Inc.,
95 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[I]t would be unreasonable to expect Carr to
pore through 427 pages of legal and accounting mumbojumbo looking for
nuggets of intelligible warnings.”); see also Posner, Contract Interpretation,
supra note 155. But see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Market Damages,
Efficient Contracting, and the Economic Waste Fallacy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1610
(2008).
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a distinct value, not as a subset of efficiency.170 It recognizes
that an ‘‘efficient choice’’ is not coexistent with a ‘‘fair
choice.’’171 It does so by weighing a ‘‘rights’’ based efficiency
analysis in light of a ‘‘goodness’’ based fairness analysis,
without sublimating one to the other in determining
whether to enforce a contract.172
Take the example of a party who opportunistically takes
advantage of the liabilities of a debtridden patent holder by
purchasing a patented drug for use as an exclusive life
saving drug at a bargain basement price. Assume that the
buyer’s aim is to corner the drug market and to double the
retail price of the drug. Assume, too, that the purchase was
efficient for the buyer acting as a “selfinterested egoist who
maximi[z]es utility”;173 that the original patent holder would
have become bankrupt but for the sale of the patent; that
the patent buyer was opportunistic in taking advantage of
the seller’s financial plight to secure the patent at half its
market value; and that doubling the market price increased
health hazards to patients who could no longer afford to buy
the drug.174
Under a monist Law and Economics analysis, the value
of efficiency is paramount; other values are subordinated to
170. For example, a court may invoke plural values to arrive at an efficient or
fair outcome at the expense of ex ante certainty in contracting. See, e.g., Robert
E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847,
858 (2000) (“If there are to be tradeoffs, why not trade off the chimera of ex ante
certainty in favor of ex post efficiency (or fairness).”). On the tension between
the ‘‘foresight’’ of risks by contracting parties and efficient outcomes, see Robert
A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68 CORNELL
L. REV. 617, 626 (1983).
171. The argument that efficient choices may also be fair choices may include
an ancillary assessment as to whether paternalism is efficient. See, e.g., Eyal
Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 230 (1998); Anthony T.
Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 77884
(1983).
172. Such an analysis presupposes that the value of efficiency, however
complex it may be, remains a monist value. However, if a decision agent chooses
between such efficiency as a rightsbased value and a competing fairnessbased
value, that choice gives rise to decisional dualism. See supra notes 80, 170.
173. C.G. Veljanovski, The Economic Approach
Introduction, 7 BRIT. J. LAW & SOC’Y 158, 162 (1980).

to

Law:

A

Critical

174. Assume, too, that the drug is either not covered by public and private
health insurance, and/or that a significant proportion of patents are uninsured.
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it. If the purchase of the patent is efficient, other values
based on equity between the parties and the public interest
in an affordable drug are not determinative except as
subsets of efficiency. Now assume that a monist court
contends that its efficiency analysis actually encompasses
such equitable and public interests. The risk is that, in
reducing such values to costs and benefits or some other
measure of efficiency, it will extend the efficiency analysis
selectively to include some equity and fairness values while
excluding others. For example, a monist court justifies the
efficiency of the patent sale on grounds that, had the sale
not occurred, the patent seller would have gone insolvent
and the drug would have been withdrawn from the market.
It invokes a further efficiency analysis to legitimate the
buyer doubling the price of the drug on grounds that, had it
not bought the patent, all drug users would have been
denied access to a drug that was no longer available. In the
monist scenario, an efficiency rationale trumps both the
countervailing unfairness to the beleaguered seller of the
patent and the social harm arising from doubling the drug
price.175
Assume now that another court adopts a pluralistic
view, taking account of incommensurable “rightness” and
“goodness” values on their own terms, not by treating them
as subsets of efficiency. So conceived, it considers that,
however efficient the sale is for the patent purchaser, it is
inequitable for the beleaguered patent seller; or it leads to
an “impoverished, presocial conception of human life” in
being unaffordable for most drug users.176 That pluralist
court could conceivably reach the same determination as the
monist court adhering to an efficiency analysis, but only
when the plural analysis justifies that determination.
What pluralism adds is a framework for assessing the
legitimacy of the patent sale that is wider than the
framework provided by an efficiency analysis. Operating
with that plural framework, decision agents, varying from
175. An efficiency analysis would not necessarily produce this result. For
example, it may be concluded that the sale of the patent is inefficient because
the benefit to the drug purchaser is outweighed by the cost to the patent seller
and/or to consumers who can no longer afford to buy the drug.
176. TREBILCOCK, supra note 1, at 18. On the prospect of ‘‘patterned
differences’’ in efficient choices including fairness values, see, for example,
NOZICK, supra note 96, at 15657.
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legislatures to courts, can explore a wider range of partyto
party rights and public interests than arise under a
restrictive efficiency analysis. They can develop ‘‘winner
takesome’’ remedies that allow for incremental increases in
drug prices within a monitoring regime that extends beyond
“winnertakeall” results.
Law and Economics is not without a response to these
plural challenges.177 As the ‘‘second wave’’ of Law and
Economics recognizes, a comprehensive costbenefit analysis
takes account of values like corrective and distributive
justice without subjecting them to narrow conceptions of
profit maximization.178 In effect, the efficiency of the sale of
the patent drug depends on how it is weighed in light of the
equitable interests of the patent seller in the first instance179
and the cost to drug users as a further inquiry.180 The
problem with this ‘‘second wave’’ is that, despite recognizing
goodness based values such as relate to the public interest,
it subjects those values to rightsbased directives aimed at
maximizing individuated free choice. Pluralism holds that
decision agents ought to decide ex posteriori according to a
plural assessment of competing values that are identified,
ranked, and weighed according to measures that are not all
reduced to efficiency values.181
177. On the attempt to add a moral dimension to efficient choice, see Richard
A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637
(1998). But see Ellis Washington, Reply to Judge Richard Posner on the
Inseparability of Law and Morality, RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 1 (2001).
178. But see Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107
MICH. L. REV. 1349 (2009); Omri BenShahar & Ariel Porat, Foreward, Fault in
American Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2009).
179. A utilitarian may nevertheless resist pluralism by insisting that such
equity values are encompassed within a monist value of utility. See, e.g., Posner,
supra note 177.
180. Courts adhering to preference monism may also decline to set the patent
aside on public interest grounds because they lack ‘‘lawmaking’’ authority and
in the absence of a legislated mandate. On ‘‘preference monism’’ in utilitarian
thought, see supra note 159. Preference monism may also be explicated through
rational determinism. See generally Richard Craswell, In That Case, What Is the
Question? Economics and the Demands of Contract Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903
(2003).
181. See Ralf Michaels, The Second Wave of Comparative Law and Economics?
59 U. TORONTO L.J. 197 (2009); Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, Willfulness
Versus Expectation: A PromisorBased Defense of Willful Breach Doctrine, 107
MICH. L. REV. 1517 (2009). But see TREBILCOCK, supra note 1. Trebilock attempts
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This is not to claim that an efficiency analysis can never
be pluralist, but rather that the Law and Economics default
position in the formation of contracts, more often than not,
is monist in character. The alternative is to subscribe to
preference pluralism in which no one “rightness” or
“fairness” value is construed a priori as more valuable than
all others. No particular value, like efficiency, need be
stretched beyond its reasonable limits, and no other plural
value need be discounted by reason of not being treated as
efficient.182
X. UNITARY OR PLURAL RATIONALITY?
A monist conception of rationality holds that adherence
to a prescribed process of rationality is itself a ‘‘super’’ value
by which decision agents like courts identify, rank, and
weigh other values in reaching contractual decisions. Most
prominent among monist conceptions of rationality is
utilitarianism, in which the purpose of the decision agent is
to arrive at the greatest happiness of the greatest number
through a rational process that maximizes upon utility, or
in Law and Economics terms, that promotes efficiency in
contracting.183
Unlike a monist conception of rationality, a court
adhering to plural rationality does not treat a ‘‘super’’
rational process leading to a decision as inherently more

to find answers with Law and Economics to questions such as whether it’s
permissible to buy and sell blood, id. at 2728; bodily organs, id. at 3436;
surrogate babies, id. at 4857; and sexual favors, id. at 3842; Symposium, Law,
Economics and Public Policy: Essays in Honour of Michael Trebilcock, 60 U.
TORONTO L.J 155 (2010); Todd D. Rakoff, Too Many Theories, 94 MICH. L. REV.
1799 (1996) (reviewing MICHAEL TREBILOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREE OF CONTRACT
(1993)).
182. On ‘‘preference pluralism,’’ see supra notes 12 and 17. On the interface
between plural values and efficient breach, see Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach
of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947, 968 (1982).
183. On rationality in utilitarianism including law and economics, see supra
Section IX. Rational choice may also marry behavioral efficiency with the
‘‘biology’’ of behavior. On rationality in relation to behavioral economics and
behavior biology, see Owen D. Jones, TimeShifted Rationality and the Law of
Law’s Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U. L.
REV. 1141, 1151 (2001).
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rational than all other rational processes.184 For example, it
uses different processes of rational reasoning as well as
disparate plural measures to determine when to enforce a
promise in contract,185 when to uphold a transaction as
efficient, and when to construe a contract term as fair.186 In
so employing ‘‘preference rationality,’’ it arrives at different
value choices by adopting an amalgam of values.187
Courts that subscribe to preference rationality may
ultimately accord higher worth to one value, such as
efficiency, than to others in the formation of a contract.
However, that preference stems not from the a priori
primacy of one value, such as logical positivism as arises
under preference monism, but from rationally assessing
that value in light of other ‘‘rightness’’ and ‘‘fairness’’
values. For example, a judge who seeks to determine a ‘‘just
price’’ in a discrete transaction may employ different
rational processes to assess how that price was set,188 how it
compares to the price of comparable products, and how to
regulate predatory prices in a particular market.189 The
court’s preference for a particular model of pricing stems,
not from the per se efficiency of that preference, but from a
rational assessment of it in light of market conditions, cost
184. On ‘‘preference rationality,’’ see STOCKER, supra note 9, at 19092;
WILLIAMS, supra note 9.
185. On the rationality of keeping one’s promises, see Peter Vallentyne, The
Rationality of Keeping Agreements, in CONTRACTARIANISM AND RATIONAL CHOICE:
ESSAYS ON DAVID GAUTHIER’S MORALS BY AGREEMENT 177 (Peter Vallentyne ed.,
1991).
186. On the relationship between ‘‘rightness’’ and ‘‘fairness” values, see supra
text accompanying notes 3032.
187. An issue in exercising ‘‘rational’’ choices is whether a pluralist is rational
in regretting the consequence of a ‘‘correct’’—or at least, preferred—moral
choice. See STOKER, supra note 9, at 27177; WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 3039.
188. On the history of the “just price,” see LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW
MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW ch. 1 (1983) [hereinafter
TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT]. On functional ways in which to arrive at a “just
price,” see Bernard W. Dempsey, Just Price in a Functional Economy, 25 AM.
ECON. REV. 471, 471, 47476, 48086 (1935); Raymond de Roover, The Concept of
the Just Price: Theory and Economic Policy, 18 J. ECON. HIST. 418, 42034
(1959).
189. See Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the
Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the
Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEG. STUD. 283, 31214 (1995).
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price correlations, competitor pricing, and perceptions of
market abuse, among other factors.190 In identifying the
plural alternatives, the court is likely to consider prevailing
monetary policies; regulations directed at redressing
predatory prices; and policies aimed at compensating for
and deterring aberrant pricing practices. In identifying and
ranking these values, it is likely to consider positive
economics to assess how prices are set; behavioral studies to
evaluate the market impact on prices;191 and compliance
measures to determine the effectiveness of pricing
regulations on a casebycase or systemic basis.192
One criticism of preference rationality is that it is
subject to manipulation. In effect, the enforcement or non
enforcement of a contract is rational only because the
presiding decision agent so asserts.193 A somewhat different
criticism is that such rational assertions lead to
indeterminacy in establishing whether a contract is
190. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form
Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1278 (2003) (arguing
that the efficient use of standard form contracts, including greater use of
mandatory contract terms and judicial modification of the unconscionability
doctrine, responds to the primary cause of contractual inefficiency); see also Ian
Macneil, Bureaucracy and Contracts of Adhesion, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 5
(1984) (arguing that adhesive conditions are often drafted to discourage
consumers from reading them).
191. On classical commentary on the use of positive economics to measure
behavioural practices, see, for example, Milton Friedman, The Methodology of
Positive Economics, in THE METHODOLOGY OF POSITIVE ECONOMICS: REFLECTIONS
ON THE MILTON FRIEDMAN LEGACY 3 (Uskali Mäki ed., 2009); George L. Priest,
Selective Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 421 (1980); see
Mario J. Rizzo, Can There Be a Principle of Explanation in Common Law
Decisions? A Comment on Priest, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (1980); see also Korobkin,
supra note 190. Cf. Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr., Justice, Efficiency, and the
Economic Analysis of Law: A Comment on Fried, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 355, 35560
(1980).
192. On such regulatory measures, see supra Part VII. Compliance measures
may include explicitly prohibiting customers from altering the terms of a
contract. See Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration:
Whither Consent?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1335 (1996).
193. Some commentators on the law of unconscionability find little “rational”
place for law and economics in reaching determinations based on “conscience.”
See, e.g., Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—Emperor’s New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 54758 (1967); cf. Richard A. Epstein,
Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 31113 (1975).

1078

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

enforceable.194
Blaming
preference
rationality
for
indeterminacy fails to recognize its intrinsic value in
comprehensively synthesizing plural values, more so than
under preference monism.195 Preference rationality helps
decision agents assess the process and results of
preferential bargaining in consumer contracting, to police
boilerplate contracts, and to regulate transgressions from
that regulatory regime.196 Decision agents also have access
to different mechanisms by which to exercise rational
preferences about enforcing contracts, such as demographic
and ethnographic studies that analyze ‘‘patterns’’ of
consumer behavior as well as by considering the age,
gender, education, and wealth of different kinds or classes
of consumers.197
Preference rationality can aid decision agents in
reaching rational, as distinct from rationalized results. In
particular, they can use rational study to explain and
respond to such issues as irregular price ‘‘spikes’’ in target
markets, and to determine the ‘‘just’’ or ‘‘fair’’ price.198

194. On such indeterminacy, see Joseph Singer, The Player and the Cards:
Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 11 (1984). A further concern is that
reversals in policy are often difficult to achieve. See Yair Listokin, Learning
Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 52224 (2008).
195. The claim is not that ”preference rationality” is value neutral among the
plural alternatives, only that it can facilitate choices among them in a manner
that value monism precludes. See John O. Newman, Between Legal Realism and
Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of Institutional Values, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 200,
204 (1984); Alvin B. Rubin, Doctrine in DecisionMaking: A Rationale or
Rationalization?, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 357, 36667.
196. On the legal significance of boilerplate contracting, see Robert B. Ahdieh,
The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (2006); Omri BenShahar &
James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto Manufacturing
Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2006); David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden
Roles of Boilerplate and StandardForm Contracts: Strategic Imposition of
Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive Effects, 104
MICH. L. REV. 983 (2006). But cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Commentary,
Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1223 (2006).
197. On the reliability of statistical evidence, see Edward K. Cheng, A
Practical Solution to the Reference Class Problem, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 2081,
208183 (2009). Cf. Daniel Shaviro, StatisticalProbability Evidence and the
Appearance of Justice, 103 HARV. L. REV. 530, 53031 (1989).
198. On the “just price,” see supra note 188.
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XI. FUNCTIONALISM AS DECISION PROCEDURE PLURALISM
Functionalism defines contracts, not in terms of its
constituent elements, but according to its causes and effects,
such as the causal relationship between the state of mind
and behavior of the contracting parties in the formation of
contracts.199 For example, functionalists utilize both
empiricism and logic to determine the causal relationship
between the intention of the parties and their contractual or
noncontractual behavior.200 Functionalists have various
tools at their disposal. They use psychological and
sociological analysis to verify and reify normative
suppositions about contractual and noncontractual
behavior in particular kinds of family and employment
relationships.201 They use positive economics to measure
patterns of behavior in those relationships.202
The benefit of functionalism is in assisting decision
agents to better understand contractual behavior, such as
when business relations are concluded informally; when the
parties dispense with formal contracts crafted by lawyers;
and the manner in which they settle their differences
through third party facilitators such as collaborative
mediators.203 Empirical and analytical functionalism also
199. Functionalism in law is closely identified with Roscoe Pound and the
school of ‘‘sociological jurisprudence.’’ See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18
YALE L.J. 454 (1909).
200. For a classical theory of functionalism applied to contract law, see W.
Friedman, Changing Functions of Contract in the Common Law, 9 U. TORONTO
L.J. 15 (1951); see also ROGER COTTERELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION 11921 (Butterworths 2d ed. 1992) (1984); W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL
THEORY 21819 (Stevens & Sons Ltd. 5th ed. 1967) (1944). But see Felix S.
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 83843 (1935).
201. On use of sociological study to assess attitudes towards contracting
among select classes of business people, see, for example, Stewart Macaulay,
Freedom from Contract: Solutions in Search of a Problem?, 2004 WIS. L. REV.
777, 77980 [hereinafter Macaulay, Freedom from Contract]; Stewart Macaulay,
NonContractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV.
55, 6267 (1963) [hereinafter Macaulay, NonContractual Relations in Business].
202. On the history of social science research methodologies in law, see, for
example, John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Judicial Use of Social Science
Research, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 571, 58081 (1991).
203. On the use of functional verification to legitimate Law and Economics to
its critics, see Guido Calabresi, About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald
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helps explain how regulatory measures work, such as
schemes to monitor and redress anticompetitive behavior
in consumer industries.204
Decision agents also use functionalism as a tool in
assessing the relationship between contractual and non
contractual behavior. For example, courts can admit ‘‘social
fact’’ evidence to determine the causal connection between
education, professional background and employment
history, and particular kinds of contractual behavior.205
They can resort to functional studies in assessing the
parameters of noncontractual behavior, such as when
informal ‘‘trust building’’ between negotiating parties
operates outside the purview of contracts.206
Functional study is not invariably value neutral.
Decision agents employ it as much to affirm as to test their
value hypotheses about the causal relationship between the
intention of the parties and patterns of contractual
behavior. At its worst, functional analysis is dressed up to
Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553, 55861 (1980); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 109395 (1972).
204. On sociolegal theory as the coalescence between social theory and
pragmatism, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIOLEGAL THEORY:
PRAGMATISM AND A SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW 10509 (1997). On the capacity of
pragmatism to edify pluralism, see James Bohman, Theories, Practices, and
Pluralism: A Pragmatic Interpretation of Critical Social Science, 29 PHIL. SOC.
SCI. 459, 45961 (1999). On the public regulation of contractual behavior, see
supra notes 121124.
205. See supra note 201. On ‘‘trust building,’’ see RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST AND
TRUSTWORTHINESS 18691 (2002); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTI TRUST IMPLICATIONS 10609 (1975); Frank B.
Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1460, 148588 (2005); Tom Tyler &
Steven L. Blader, Justice and Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF NEGOTIATION
AND CULTURE 301 (Michele J. Gelfand & Jeanne M. Brett eds., 2004).
206. On ‘‘social fact’’ evidence, see Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking,
80 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 93637 (1980); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social
Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 877 (1988).
On an implied covenant of good faith in contracting, see Teri J Dobbins, Losing
Faith: Extracting the Implied Covenant of Good Faith from (Some) Contracts, 84
OR. L. REV. 227, 23132 (2005); Harold Dubroff, The Implied Covenant of Good
Faith in Contract Interpretation and GapFilling: Reviling a Revered Relic, 80
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 559, 56164 (2006); Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions:
Toward an Expansive Equality Approach to the Doctrine of Good Faith in
Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1025, 102833 (2003).
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validate predetermined normative ideologies, and
degenerates into “highly amorphous sociological inquiry”
with dubious instrumental ends.207 Its use raises doubt as to
whether empiricists have asked the ‘‘right’’ questions; it is
potentially expensive and selfjustifying; and it can lead to
inconclusive and unreliable results respecting the
enforceability of contracts.208
At its best, functional analysis identifies values and test
suppositions relating to contractual and noncontractual
behavior without becoming captive to those values or
suppositions. It assists in determining the reasons for the
breakdown in trust building between parties to non
contractual dealings and the reasons for their resort to
formalized contracts. It also helps decision agents to
address party conflicts arising from shifting horizontally to
vertically integrated relationships in changing market
conditions.209
How well functional studies work in practice depends on
such factors as the complexity of the behavior under
analysis, the suppositions underlying the behavioral
analysis, and the perceived reliability of the results reached
such as in enforcing a contract. Functional analysis can
assume that contracting parties in similar situations will
207. See TREBILCOCK, supra note 1, at 141. For a critique of the use, inter alia,
of functional study to support Law and Economics, see Duncan Kennedy,
Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special
References to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV.
563, 621 (1982). But see Thomas Brennan et al., Economic Trends and Judicial
Outcomes: A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1191 (2009).
208. See, e.g., Jack Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions about
Judicial Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531 (2009). Of further concern is
whether the results of field investigation are worth the costs. See, e.g., Monahan
& Walker, supra note 202. Such inconclusiveness may stem from an ideological
assumption that contracting parties value the free market and that deviations
from such values are explicable by studying market imperfections and
bargaining disparities in particular cases. So conceived, the empirical analysis
concentrates on identifying such market and bargaining imperfections, failing to
assess the extent to which study subjects may doubt the value of a free market
on other grounds.
209. On functional study in predicting judicial behavior, see Lee Loevinger,
Jurimetrics: The Methodology of Legal Inquiry, in JURIMETRICS 5 (Hans W.
Baade ed., 1963); Lee Loevinger, Jurimetrics: The Next Step Forward, 33 MINN.
L. REV. 455 (1949). On limitations in the use of functional study to regulate
contracts under the UCITA, see supra text accompanying note 125.
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conceivably act alike. It cannot account for contractual
behavior that is not demonstrated through rational or
empirical study.
XII. CONSTRUING COMMENSURABLE AND INCOMMENSURABLE
VALUES
An interpretative theory of contracting holds that the
formation of contracts is determined primarily through a
process of interpretation, or more expansively, through
contract construction.210 The interpretation of contracts is
grounded in monism when courts interpret contracts in
accordance with ‘‘super’’ values, such as the ‘‘wills’’ or
‘‘consent’’ of the parties.211 More comprehensively, they
construe contracts according to their utility or efficiency.212
Courts adopt monist ‘‘decision procedure’’ when they
interpret the ‘‘plain word’’ of contracts so as to reflect the
subjective wills of the parties through the literal words used
in those contracts.213
A plural approach to contract interpretation considers
both plural rightness and goodness values. These vary from
the express rights of the parties to a contract to the ‘‘good
faith’’ responsibilities imputed to them beyond monist
conceptions of their wills or consent.214 For example, judges
engage in pluralism in construing ‘‘good faith” in
negotiations according to the fairness of the negotiating
210. A leading theorist on contract interpretation is Stephen A. Smith. See
SMITH, supra note 1. For a critique of this book, see Oman, supra note 19. But
see HILLMAN, supra note 1, at 125.
211. On monist methods of interpretation, see supra Section I; see also Leon E.
Trakman, Interpreting Contracts: A Common Law Dilemma, 59 CAN. BAR. REV.
241 (1981). But see Colin Farrelly, The Institutional Theory of Legal
Interpretation, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 217 (2008).
212. See Karen Eggleston et al., The Design and Interpretation of Contracts:
Why Complexity Matters, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 91 (2000); Steven Shavell, On the
Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 289 (2006).
213. On the ‘‘plain meaning’’ of a contract, see Eric A. Posner, The Parol
Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual
Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 57071 (1998).
214. On the influence of plural values upon the “substantive” interpretation of
contracts, see, for example, Charny, supra note 80; Avery Wiener Katz, The
Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 496 (2004); Trakman, supra note 211.
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tactics employed, beyond express agreement between the
parties as to the process of such negotiations.215 They
construe the ‘‘true meaning’’ of a contract expansively
according to plural conceptions of dependability,
responsibility and accountability, beyond the ‘‘plain words’’
meaning of a contract.216
In practice, decision agents often commence using
monist methods of interpretation and conclude with plural
constructions of contracts.217 Judges start by interpreting
‘‘whole agreement clauses’’ in contracts as ‘‘fully integrated’’
in expressing the wills, consent or promises of the parties;
and admit extrinsic evidence only to clarify ambiguities in
those contracts.218 They progress to ‘‘filling gaps’’ in those
contracts by taking account of the course of dealings219 and
performance of the parties,220 the ‘‘network effect’’ of the
215. On the implied covenant to negotiate in ‘‘good faith,’’ see Chris Williams,
The Search for Bases of Decision in Commercial Law: Llewellyn Redux, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1495 (1984) (reviewing LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE
EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW (1983)). On the influence of culture on plural
methods of interpretation, see infra Section XIV. See generally PRACTICAL
CONFLICTS: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS (Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler eds.,
2004).
216. The “true meaning” may be monist or pluralist, depending on whether
‘‘truth’’ in interpretation is identified with a “super” value that transcends all
other values. On the “true meaning” of the contract, as distinct from its “plain”
or “ordinary meaning,” see Avery W. Katz, Contractual Incompleteness: A
Transactional Perspective, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 169 (2005); Posner, supra
note 213, at 533.
217. On more structured steps in interpretation, see, for example, ANDREI
MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY ch. 3 (2d ed. 2005); Ronald
Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527 (1982). But see Stanley
Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 551 (1982) (arguing that Dworkin falls prey to the same fallacies of
“pure objectivity” and “pure subjectivity” that he has fought so vehemently to
challenge).
218. On establishing the “true meaning” of the contract, see supra note 216.
Courts can also use canons of interpretation, like the contra proferentem rule to
support both unitary and pluralist theories of construction. See, e.g., Michelle E.
Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1105 (2006).
219. See U.C.C. § 1303(b) (2001) (course of dealings).
220. Id. § 1303(a) (2001) (course of performance). For an argument that the
parties should devise their own rules of contract interpretation, see Katz, supra
note 214, at 496.
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conduct of the parties,221 and by imputing industry norms to
them.222 They conclude by constructing judicial boundaries
between selfinterest and altruism in imposing duties on
parties to use best efforts in contracting.223
Similarly, courts commence with the monist assumption
that contracts have lacunae or ‘‘gaps’’ which they need to
‘‘fill’’ to clarify or complete the intention of the parties.224
They progress to ‘‘filling gaps’’ in contracts on grounds of
fairness that go beyond clarifying ambiguities or completing
inchoate terms in those contracts.225
There is nothing extraordinary about decision agents
moving from monist to plural methods of filling gaps in
contracts. The trepidation is over the justification for, and
permissible extent of ‘‘gap filling’’ in particular contexts.
Those who decline to ‘‘fill gaps’’ in contracts on principled
grounds can contend that courts should not ‘‘make
contracts’’ at variance with the wills or consent of the
parties.226 Those who identify gap filling with the intention
of the parties can claim that they are merely clarifying or
completing the intention of the parties, whereas their
221. On this network effect, see Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal
Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L .REV. 479, 587 (1998);
Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network
Externalities, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79, 110 (2001).
222. See U.C.C. § 1303(c) (2001) (usage of trade); see also David V. Snyder,
Language and Formalities in Commercial Contracts: A Defense of Custom and
Conduct, 54 SMU L. REV. 617, 620 (2001).
223. On the requirement of “good faith” primarily in relation to performance,
as distinct from “good faith” in contracting, see Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727
F.2d 1145, 115253 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and
the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 37273
(1980); E. Allan Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One’s Promises: The Duty of
Best Efforts in Contract Law, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1984); Robert S. Summers,
The General Duty of Good Faith—Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982).
224. Such “gap filling” is monist in subscribing to a monist wills or consent
theory of contracting. See supra Sections II, III.
225. On normative influences including “gap filling” on contract interpretation,
see Charny, supra note 80; Katz, supra note 214. But see George M. Cohen,
Implied Terms and Interpretation in Contract Law, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS 78, 90 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
226. The underlying assumption is that the wills, consent, or promise exhaust
their intentions, leaving no scope for “gap filling.” See supra Section II, III, VI.
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decisions may reflect plural values which transcend those
intentions.227 Those that are reluctant to acknowledge their
use of opentextured methods of contract construction can
use legal fictions to hypothecate and objectify the
unarticulated intentions of the parties, along judicially
inventive lines.228 The problem lies in the morass of methods
of interpretation that decision agents conceive of
inconsistently and apply unpredictably in determining
when and how to enforce a contract. Those who defer to
rightsbased methods of interpretation are likely to limit
gap filling to the express promises and consent of the
parties. Those who adhere to communal methods of
construction are likely to fill gaps in line with “fairness”
values that are based on preconceived conceptions of the
communal good, beyond the express promises or consent of
the parties.229
What pluralism offers is an interpretative platform
along which decision agents can identify and weigh the
plural alternatives in construing contracts, without
succumbing to a unidimensional conception of contracting.
It encourages decision agents to explore opentextured
methods of construing contract terms, such as by taking
account of the changing boundaries between trust building
in relational contracting and its failure. Pluralism also
raises the specter of decision agents interpreting contracts,
not only to identify the rights and duties of the parties, but
to rebuild trust and confidence between them in their
relational context.230
227. Jurists have long recognized a difference between “interpreting” a
contract and “constructing” its terms. See, e.g., 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE RULES OF CONTRACT
LAW § 534 (1960); see also Arthur L. Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract,
28 YALE L.J. 739, 740–41 (1919).
228. See Leon E. Trakman, Frustrated Contracts and Legal Fictions, 46 MOD.
L. REV. 39 (1983). But cf. Cohen, supra note 225 (examining economic
arguments for textualism and contextualism). For challenges directed by “new
formalists” against judicial gap filling by realist courts, see Bernstein, supra
note 102; Symposium, Formalism Revisited, 66 CHI. L. REV. 527 (1999).
229. On the merits of a new criterion for default rules in incomplete contracts,
namely, filling gaps in contracts with terms that are favorable to the party with
the greater bargaining power, see Omri BenShahar, A Bargaining Power
Theory of Default Rules, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 396 (2009).
230. For evidence that sophisticated parties often may prefer a default rule
that strictly enforces their contract rather than ‘‘delegate’’ authority to courts to
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XIII. BEYOND CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Critical social, race, and feminist scholars attack neo
classical theories of contracting for relying on selfserving
liberal values.231 They challenge liberal courts for enshrining
the right of the atomized individual to act as a free,
efficient, rational, and functional agent;232 for transforming
“private” rights to contract into benefits for the moneyed
elite;233 for undermining the enterprise bargaining needs of
the working poor in the corporate interest; for
disempowering women and minorities in commercial
relations; and for artificially differentiating between private
rights to contract and the public good.234
Critical analysis also confronts the judiciary for raising
legal form over legal substance;235 for using paternalistic
principles of contract law to mask substantive inequalities
between the parties in the formation of contracts;236 for
invoking selfserving contract procedures to perpetuate
systemic disadvantages;237 for recasting a “reasonable white
fill gaps on equitable or other grounds, see Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott,
Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023
(2009).
231. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 207, at 621.
232. For a strident critique of liberal rights, see Peter Gabel, The
Phenomenology of RightsConsciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves,
62 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1984).
233. See, e.g, Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982).
234. On the institutional disempowerment of minorities “without consent”
tracing back to slavery, see ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, WITHOUT CONSENT OR
CONTRACT: THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN SLAVERY (1989). On the
disempowerment of women, see, for example, FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
CONTRACT LAW (Linda Mulcahy & Sally Wheeler eds., 2005). On the use of
“adhesion contracts” to disempower consumers, see supra notes 28, 120.
235. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
236. Critical legal theorists like Duncan Kennedy reflect on the somewhat
paternalistic need for “the decision maker . . . to take the beneficiary under his
wing and tell him what he can and cannot do.” Kennedy, supra note 207, at 634.
237. On the critical deconstruction of liberal theory on grounds, inter alia¸ of
disempowerment, see Jon Bruschke, Deconstructive Arguments in the Legal
Sphere: An Analysis of the Fischl/Massey Debate About Critical Legal Studies,
32 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 16 (1995).
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male person” into a “reasonable person” standard;238 and for
falsely equating that standard with the fair treatment of
those whom it disenfranchises.239
Critical scholars also confront the restrictive nature of
plural preferences, including their relation to the formation
of contracts.240 For example, they question judicial pluralists
for aligning private rights to contract with a “plural good,”
which they conceive as no greater than the sum of liberal
privileges within it.241 They challenge law reform proponents
for invoking procedural rights selectively in order to
perpetuate “private” rights to contract at the expense of
communal values.242 They confront postlegal realists for
allowing themselves to be coopted by mainstream liberal
thought;243 and they attribute indeterminacy, including in
the formation of contracts, to pluralist courts that avoid
transgressing beyond preset liberal boundaries.244
238. Feminist critiques are among the most compelling challenges to consent
based models of contracting, including the judicial application of a reasonable
“man” standard. See FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT LAW, supra note 234;
Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J.
997, 106365 (1985); see also Cynthia Grant Bowman et al., Race and Gender in
the Law Review, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 27 (2006); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of
Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991). On critical race theory, see RICHARD
DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY (2001).
239. Some of this criticism revolves around the “language” and “culture” that
is ascribed to legal liberalism, including the “reasonable person” standard. See
generally Christine A. Desan Hussan, Expanding Legal Vocabulary: The
Challenge Posed by the Deconstruction and Defense of Law, 95 YALE L.J. 969
(1986); Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Critique, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1147
(2001); Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
240. The attack on pluralism is presented, in part, through liberalism’s
allegedly dubious reliance on the divide between public and private values. See,
e.g., Kennedy, supra note 233.
241. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 239.
242. On the importance of utopian community values in the development of
Critical Legal Studies, see Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal
Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983).
243. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 215.
244. On such indeterminacy, see Singer, supra note 194, at 11. But see Robert
W. Benson, How Judges Fool Themselves: The Semiotics of the Easy Case, in 2
LAW AND SEMIOTICS 31, 3233 (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1988); Kenneth Kress,
Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 286 (1989).
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Critical scholars have a legitimate quarrel with judicial
reliance on monist and plural theories of contract formation
that originate in legal liberalism. Judges who adopt monist
theories based on the wills, consent, or promises of the
contracting parties accord priority to individual rights at
the expense of countervailing social, economic, and political
values.245 Courts that orient preference pluralism around
“rightness” more than “goodness” values perpetuate the
liberal status quo, ignoring the extent to which contracts
ought to promote the values of community and solidarity.246
What
critical
scholars
have
not
adequately
acknowledged is the extent to which statutes and judicial
precedents have enhanced plural conceptions of equality in
the intersection of cultural differences. However marginal
these achievements are, they have given at least some
protection to select classes of employees and consumers,
women, and visible minorities.247
Critical scholarship’s nihilist critique has also failed to
produce a viable alternative to the judicial application of
pluralism in the formation of contracts, other than through
utopian idealism.248 The utopian conception of ‘‘the good,’’ to
which some critical theorists subscribe, may be virtuous,
but it may also regress into the preferred idealism of some
utopian theorists at the expense of others.249
245. See supra Sections IIIV.
246. On this criticism, see, for example, Singer, supra note 194. On the
relationship between the “self” and “community” in postmodernity, see, for
example, WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 5758 (1989);
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 20405 (Univ. of
Notre Dame Press 2d ed. 1984) (1981); PRIVATE ACTION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD
(Walter W. Powell & Elisabeth S. Clemens eds., 1998); CHARLES TAYLOR,
SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY (1989); WALZER,
supra note 11, at 3135.
247. Critical scholarship, arguably, has also failed to acknowledge the
contributions made by Legal Realism to equality rights including through
contracts. On the legal realist movement, see generally LLEWELLYN, supra note
120.
248. On such utopian idealism, see Unger, supra note 242, at 583. But see
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (2005). For an existential exposition of utopia,
see MARTIN BUBER, PATHS IN UTOPIA (Syracuse Univ. Press 1996) (1949).
249. See Unger, supra note 242. For a conservative attack on the radical
agenda of Critical Theory, including for undermining its multicultural
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XIV. CULTURAL PLURALISM
Cultural
pluralism
acknowledges
the
cultural
background and life experiences that particular groups such
as religious, cultural, political, and economic communities
share.250 It is about the impact that their different
backgrounds and life experiences have upon their individual
practices,251 such as the impact that their religious
affiliations have on marriage contracting, or on agreements
between spiritual leaders and their congregants.252 Cultural
pluralism is also concerned with fostering cultural
inclusivity, such as by using collaborative law to resolve
contract disputes between family members who are willing
to work together to resolve differences,253 and by applying

aspirations, see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE
RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 5, 1921 (1997). But cf. HILLMAN,
supra note 1, at 190211.
250. Will Kymlicka defines a “societal culture” as “a culture which provides its
members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities,
including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life,
encompassing both public and private spheres.” WILL KYMLICKA,
MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 76 (1995).
He adds that cultures may be “territorially concentrated, and based on a shared
language.” Id.; see also THE CHALLENGE OF CULTURAL PLURALISM (Stephen
Brooks ed., 2002); AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE: COMMUNITY AND
MORALITY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 204 (1996); Monique Deveaux, Cultural
Pluralism from Liberal Perfectionist Premises, 32 POLITY 473 (2000); Amy
Gutmann, Liberty and Pluralism in Pursuit of the NonIdeal, 66 SOC. RES. 1039
(1999); George Kateb, Can Cultures Be Judged? Two Defenses of Cultural
Pluralism in Isaiah Berlin’s Work, 66 SOC. RES. 1009 (1999).
251. A significant attribute of culture pluralism is the culture of tolerance,
including tolerance of difference. See generally THE CULTURE OF TOLERATION IN
DIVERSE SOCIETIES: REASONABLE TOLERANCE (Catriona McKinnon & Dario
Castiglione eds., 2003).
252. On such cultural values, see, for example, Kenneth Baynes, The
Liberal/Communitarian Controversy and Communicative Ethics, in
UNIVERSALISM VS. COMMUNITARIANISM: CONTEMPORARY DEBATE IN ETHICS 61
(David Rasmussen ed., 1990); Allen E. Buchanan, Assessing the Communitarian
Critique of Liberalism, 99 ETHICS 852 (1989).
253. On the Westinghouse case, see supra text accompanying notes 14551. But
cf. Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417 (2004).
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principles of restorative justice to heal culturalethnic
differences.254
Cultural pluralism is not an allpurpose solvent for
every ill in the formation of contracts. It helps to
understand historicalcultural developments, such as the
influence of nineteenth century liberal values on freedom of
contract, and the impact of twentieth century consumer
welfare values upon “adhesion contracting.”255 Cultural
pluralism also responds to the intersection of differences
among cultures, such as through “connecting factors” that
link individuals to voluntary associations with competing
attitudes towards “trust building” in reaching informal and
formal agreements.256
Cultural pluralism also provides a better grasp of the
technological, linguistic, psychological, and sociological
backgrounds of the contracting parties, such as in
distinguishing between emerchants and econsumers257 and
between econsumers and emerchant consumers.258 It
254. On restorative justice, see, for example, JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION (2002); JAMES DIGNAN, UNDERSTANDING
VICTIMS AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (2005); Albert W. Dzur, Restorative Justice
and Civic Accountability for Punishment, 36 POLITY 3 (2003); Paul Takagi &
Gregory Shank, Critique of Restorative Justice, 31 SOC. JUST. 147 (2004).
255. For a libertarian rationale in support of both autonomy and welfare
values, see Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 96; cf. Russell Korobkin, Libertarian
Welfarism, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1651, 165253 (2009) (expanding the paradigm
established by Sunstein and Thaler). On recognition of the adhesion contract in
the early and mid twentieth century, see supra note 28.
256. On “trust building,” see supra note 205. See generally VICTOR GOLDBERG,
FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (2006); ERIC A. POSNER,
LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Omri BenShahar,
Precontractual Reliance, J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (2001).
257. On the allegedly artificial distinction between merchant and consumer
cultures in contracting, see Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False
Dichotomies of Contract Law, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 29697 (2005); Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (2003).
258. On whether an econsumer who buys to resell ought to be treated as an
end user “consumer” or a repeat order “merchant,” see ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996). But see Appendix, ProCD v.
Zeidenberg in Context, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 821. On whether suppliers can detect
and cater to aggressive consumers while taking advantage of other consumers,
see Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L.
REV. 679, 69293.
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assists in assessing the “free,” “fair,” “efficient,” and
“rational” behavior of those parties within discrete cultural
settings such as emerging emarkets.259
Cultural pluralism faces two particular challenges in
relation to contracting. The first is in weighing, ranking,
and applying cultural traits to distinctive kinds of
contractual and noncontractual behavior.260 The second is
in recognizing the influence that the culturalreligious
backgrounds and life experiences of decision agents have
upon the decisions they reach.261
Cultural pluralism does not have glib solutions to these
concerns, but it does have responses. Decision agents can
use anthropological and interdisciplinary studies to confirm
the nature and significance of cultural change in the
formation of contracts. They can vigilantly redress cultural
myopia, not least of all their own. But one should not
blithely assume that historicalcultural study will
invariably be illuminating, or that it will neutralize cultural
bias in deciding contract disputes.262
What cultural pluralism does for contract law is help
decisionmakers identify the impact of emerging and
receding cultural traits upon contractual behavior. For
example, it assists them to assess the impact that “new”
twentyfirst century merchants have on precontractual
259. On emerging ecommercial and consumer cultures including clickwrap
and browsewrap agreements, see Trakman, supra note 126.
260. See, e.g., WERNER MENSKI, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ASIA AND AFRICA (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 2006) (2000);
COMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURE (Csaba Varga ed., 1992); David Nelken, Culture,
Legal, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES 369 (David S. Clark ed., 2007); David Nelken, Using the Concept
of Legal Culture, 29 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 1 (2004).
261. On the propensity to believe that one’s views are predominant, giving rise
to ‘‘false consensus bias’’ in the interpretation of contracts, see Lawrence Solan
et al., False Consensus Bias in Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268
(2008).
262. Cultural discourse may also accentuate extreme positions. See CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: HOW LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE (2009). On
challenges to cultural pluralism within communitarian thought, see DANIEL
BELL, COMMUNITARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS (1993); DEREK L. PHILLIPS, LOOKING
BACKWARD: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF COMMUNITARIAN THOUGHT 15659 (1993);
Amitai Etzioni, The Attack on Community: The Grooved Debate, SOC’Y,
July/August 1995, at 12.
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representations and warranties in emerging areas of
contract law.263 It aids them in arriving at culturally
sensitive responses to nonprice competition within discount
consumer markets.264 It encourages decision agents to weigh
cultural values in a palpable manner, including by
acknowledging their own cultural predilections and
perspectives.265
CONCLUSION
This article challenges the application of intractable
conceptions of monism to the formation of contracts and
argues for greater resort to judicial pluralism. If monism is
about enforcing the free, efficient, or rational choices of
individual contractors, pluralism is about courts being
willing to value the cultural background and life
experiences of those who make those choices. If contract
formation is about judges preserving the reasonable
expectations of the parties, cultural pluralism is about
courts considering the socioeconomic, political, and cultural
context in which those expectations arise.266
The article disputes the presupposition that pluralism
in contracts leads to a nontheory in which all theoretical
263. A particular challenge is to measure emerging and receding cultural
trends that evolve gradually and unevenly. For example, it remains unclear to
what extent emerging consumer ecultures are distinct from other consumer
cultures. See Trakman, supra note 126; see also James Q. Whitman,
Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law, 117 YALE L.J.
340 (2007).
264. See James R. Maxeiner, StandardTerms Contracting in the Global
Electronic Age: European Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 109 (2003); Leon E.
Trakman, From the Medieval Law Merchant to EMerchant Law, 53 U. TORONTO
L.J. 265 (2003). For an early commentary on the culturallegal development of
cybercommerce, see David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The
Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996). On the “just price,” see
supra note 188.
265. On judges choosing methods of interpretation that are more likely to
generate preferred outcomes, see Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive
Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769
(2008). On attempts through jurimetrics to predict judicial behavior based on
the sociocultural and political background of judges, see Knight, supra note
208, at 1534.
266. On plural conceptions of legal rights, see TRAKMAN & GATIEN, supra note
4.
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postulations are treated as incommensurable with one
another, leading to contract nihilism. The purpose of
pluralism is not to dismiss all, or even any, contract theory
out of hand. Its purpose is to encourage exploration into the
manner in and extent to which different substantive
theories of contract formation are conceived as being
exclusive of, or complementary to, one another. Included in
such an analysis is the prospect of pluralism endorsing,
refining, and sometimes rejecting discrete conceptions of
contract formation that fail to engage with pertinent plural
values. Pluralism does not seek to accomplish these ends
through the outright rejection of liberal theories of
contracting, but to assess their operation within complex
and contradictory real world contexts.
Judicial pluralism in particular is about resisting the
polarization that arises from judicial monism in the
formation of contracts. It is concerned that courts not rigidly
pit contractual consent against noconsent, promise against
nopromise, and will against nowill in the formation of
contracts. It scrutinizes how to apply plural values to
contracts through the exercise of prudential wisdom and
practical reason. It focuses on how to reach determinations
in light of the background and life experiences of the
contracting parties, not by vaporizing those experiences
within a monist theory of contracting.
The resilience of judges in applying pluralism to
contract formation ultimately depends on two bulwark
principles. The first is that no one set of plural values is a
priori more fundamental than all others. The second is that
choosing among plural values requires an informed judicial
appraisal of their differences rather than an arbitrary
election among them. Satisfying these two principles will
determine the future of judicial pluralism in contract
formation and in some ways, the future of the law of
contract itself.

